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Imagine your deepest, darkest secret—a true, but deeply embarrassing, fact about
yourself. Now suppose that you awake one morning to find this secret suddenly revealed
to everyone you know, as well as dozens of strangers. Most of us would regard such a
turn of events as a personal catastrophe. Given the unappealing nature of this scenario,
and the ease with which juicy secrets can spread among people, one might expect that we
would play our cards close to our vests, refusing to reveal these embarrassing details to
anyone. Yet it is likely that most readers have shared their most embarrassing details with
other people: spouses, siblings, parents, best friends, clergy, psychiatrists, coworkers, or
perhaps even strangers on Trans-Atlantic flights. Indeed, millions of Americans have
shared their most intimate personal details with dozens of strangers, for example, by
participating in a twelve-step group or seeking help in an online chat room. By common
parlance, we still consider these facts to be “secrets” even after we have revealed them to
a handful of people.
But do they remain secrets for the purposes of U.S. privacy law, such that a
plaintiff can recover in tort against someone who discovers them though improper means
or publishes them in a newspaper without her consent? If so, at what point does a fact
“cross over” from being a “private matter” to a “public matter” whose widespread
disclosure does not provide the plaintiff with a cause of action? Can something still be
“private” if two people know about it? Five people? A thousand people? When John
Kerry and John Edwards were criticized for violating Mary Cheney’s “privacy” by
mentioning her sexual orientation during the recent debates, were critics making a
coherent claim?1 Where, in short, is the legal boundary between public and private?
This is the fundamental, first-principles question in privacy law, and a necessary
element in the two most important privacy torts, public disclosure of private facts and
1

For a criticism along these lines, see William Safire, The Lowest Blow—The Kerry Campaign Believes
Cheney’s Daughter Is ‘Fair Game,’ PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2004, at A17 (noting that prior to
Senator Edwards’ mention of Mary Cheney’s sexual orientation, “only political junkies knew that a
member of the Cheney family serving on the campaign staff was homosexual. The vice president, to show
it was no secret or anything his family was ashamed of, had referred to it briefly twice this year, but the
news media—respecting family privacy—had property not made it a big deal. The percentage of voters
aware of Mary Cheney’s sexual orientation was tiny.”). Mary Cheney’s sexual orientation had been
reported in newspapers long before the vice-presidential and presidential debates. See, e.g., Susan Greene,
Gays: Cheney’s Views an Issue—Daughter’s Orientation Seen as Dichotomy, DENVER POST, July 27, 2000,
at A14. As a matter of black letter law, once a fact has been reported in the press, courts hold that it is no

2

intrusion upon seclusion.2 Indeed, although I will focus on the privacy torts in this paper,
the question about what information is deemed “private” or “secret” cuts across many
areas of American law, including the Fourth Amendment, trade secrets, patents, evidence,
the constitutional right of information privacy, and the Freedom of Information Act.3
Despite the centrality of this issue, the American courts lack a coherent, consistent
methodology for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a particular fact that has been shared with one or more persons. Indeed,
jurisdictions cannot agree on a framework for resolving these kinds of cases. Hence,
Georgia law holds that disclosing sensitive information to dozens of people, and perhaps
even tens of thousands of strangers, does not necessarily render information “public” for
the purposes of the public disclosure of private facts tort,4 but Ohio law governing the
same tort holds that a plaintiff’s decision to share sensitive information with three
coworkers eviscerates her expectation of privacy in that information.5
This paper argues that insights from the emerging literature on information
transmission through social networks can help courts develop a more rigorous and
objective notion of “privacy” for the purposes of the privacy torts. It argues that privacy
tort law should not focus on the abstract, circular, and highly indeterminate question of
whether a plaintiff reasonably expected that information about himself would remain
“private” after he shared it with one or more persons. Instead, the law should focus on the
more objective and satisfying question of what extent of dissemination the plaintiff
should have expected to follow his disclosure of that information to others. The goal here
is to solidify the “privacy” inquiry as an empirical question, rather than a highlycontested normative matter. Most courts appear to be treating the question as an empirical

longer private, and third parties can disseminate the fact with immunity. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing
Co., 154 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1047-48 (1984).
2
The public disclosure of private facts tort requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant (a) gave
publicity, (b) to a private fact, (c) that is not of legitimate concern to the public, where such disclosure (d) is
highly offensive to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977).
The tort for intrusion upon seclusion requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant (a)
intentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, (b) on the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, (c) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id.
3
See infra notes 230-235.
4
Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994); Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2004).
5
Fisher v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & Correction, 578 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988).
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one presently, but they are tackling the empirical issue in a casual, careless, and confused
manner.
The literature that I introduce herein explores the ways that information flows
through society. Studying rumor transmission has long been a subject of some interest in
the sociological community, and a few more recent studies have focused on the
dissemination of information about HIV status and other sensitive forms of personal
information through an individual’s social circle. Taken as a whole, this literature
provides an informative, albeit incomplete, picture of how likely particular information is
to spread through any given social network. I will review this literature, discuss some of
its implications for privacy law, and then compare these implications to the analysis that
courts have conducted in privacy tort cases. I will argue that social network analysis is an
indispensable tool for resolving disputes where the parties to a communication disagree
about whether the recipient was entitled to share it with others.
Part I briefly explores the theoretical underpinnings of privacy tort law protection.
This part establishes a framework for the discussion that follows. Part II describes the
common law’s treatment of the question of when information that has been disclosed to
one or more people might remain private for the purposes of these torts. Part III delves
into the literature on social network analysis. It pays particularly close attention to the
ways in which network structure and cultural variables can affect the probability that
information disclosed to a few people will ultimately become known by the larger
community. Part IV uses the insights from this literature to evaluate the accuracy of
judicial efforts to assess whether litigants should have expected that information
disclosed to a group of people eventually would be disseminated much more widely. As a
general matter, courts do a reasonably good job of making these assessments, but there
are a few areas in which their intuitions lead them astray. The paper suggests that using
insights from social network theory can help courts evaluate privacy in a more accurate
and transparent matter. A brief conclusion follows in Part V.

I.

Why Protect Privacy?
The types of privacy issues that this paper seeks to resolve are those involving a

plaintiff’s disclosure of information about himself to a limited number of people. Under
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one notion of information privacy, information ceases to be private the moment it is
shared with a second person. Yet, as the Supreme Court has recognized, such an
unsophisticated conception of “privacy” is much too cramped for a society of social
beings.6 No one’s closet is devoid of skeletons. When asked to imagine the most private
facts about ourselves, we will typically think of sexual encounters and bodily functions,
sensitive medical information, shameful past misdeeds, unfavorable opinions about peers,
and knowledge of our fundamental weaknesses and fears. As I suggested at the outset,
most of us would regard the disclosure of these details to our entire circle of
acquaintances, let alone the public at large, as a personal disaster.
At the same time, no one among us has guarded that embarrassing information
with maximum diligence. Certain indubitably “private” acts, such as sexual intercourse,
necessarily take place in the presence of at least one other person. Other facts might be
created in solitude, but remain, by common parlance, “private” even when shared to some
extent. We all tell some people about our medical ailments. Virtually everyone feels the
need to unburden himself by confessing embarrassing acts to another. Indeed, sharing our
most intimate information with those who we expect to keep it secret promotes further
friendship and intimacy.7 We tend to like people who confide in us, even if we’ve met
them recently.8 One respected privacy theorist has gone so far as to suggest that “intimate
relationships simply could not exist if we did not continue to insist on privacy for them.”9
6

United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)
(“[B]oth the common law and the literal understanding of privacy encompass the individual’s control of
information concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one
time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common
law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the
passage of time rendered it private. According to Webster’s initial definition, information may be classified
as ‘private’ if it is ‘intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of persons:
not freely available to the public. . . . In sum, the fact that ‘an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not mean
that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”).
7
CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142 (1970)
(“To be friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each other. Intimacy is the sharing
of information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one
has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we
spend in friendship and love.”).
8
Thomas E. Runge & Richard L. Archer, Reactions to the Disclosure of Public and Private SelfInformation, 44 SOCIAL PSYCH. Q. 357, 361 (1981); see also Laurel Richardson, Secrecy and Status: The
Social Construction of Forbidden Relationships, 53 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 209, 213 (1988) (arguing that
disclosure of pertinent information promotes friendship and intimacy).
9
Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY
265, 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed. 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS]; see also CARL
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It should not be necessary to highlight the importance of intimacy in human society.
Indeed, describing the benefits of intimacy in economic terms, by referring to its
enormous positive externalities, in some ways understates its importance. A man or
woman without intimates is a shell of a person.
For the individual, sharing information about herself can be helpful even when
intimacy is not involved. Although concerns about intimacy provide the strongest
justifications for protecting privacy, there are other reasons why society might value
privacy as well.10 Millions of Americans participate in twelve-step programs and support
groups, where it has become completely normal to disclose to a score of strangers one’s
status as an alcoholic, bulimic, child abuse victim, heroin addict, AIDS sufferer, or
gambler.11 Sharing information within these groups can bring the discloser helpful
advice, as well as the sometimes substantial psychological relief associated with
revealing certain secrets to people the discloser expects to never encounter again.12 We
are, in short, constantly disclosing embarrassing information about ourselves to third
parties, yet we often harbor strong subjective expectations of privacy when doing so.

D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY 42 (1977) (“[I]n the area of personal relationships, such
as family, friends, and lovers, where quality is important, privacy is an operative principle. These
relationships can’t be sustained with everyone. To function, they depend on an excluding condition.
Privacy creates the moral capital that is spent in friendship and intimate relations.”); Charles Fried,
Privacy: A Moral Analysis, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra, at 203, 209 (“In general it is my thesis
that in developed social contexts love, friendship, and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and accord to
each other a certain measure of privacy.”). As an empirical matter, intimacy does exist in societies that
provide little or no legal protections for private information. That said, we should not be legal centralists
when evaluating Gerstein and Fried’s claims. This paper essentially equates legal privacy protections with
de facto privacy protections that arise via resource constraints on surveillance and impediments to
information dissemination. It may well be that in a hypothetical super-Orwellian world of complete
surveillance and instantaneous information dissemination, there would be no intimacy among human
beings.
10
For an exploration of the competing values furthered by privacy law, see Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1099-1153 (2002).
11
See Jaimie Wilson, United—By Addiction, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 20, 2001, at C1 (noting that
Alcoholics Anonymous alone has 1.16 million members in the U.S.); see also James Rachels, Why Privacy
Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 9, at 290, 295 (“Resistance to . . . group therapy
is overcome when the patients begin to think of each other not as strangers but as fellow members of the
group. The definition of a kind of relation between them makes possible frank and intimate conversation
which would have been totally out of place when they were merely strangers.”). For a discussion of the
importance of twelve-step support groups in American society, and an argument for extending an
evidentiary privilege to communications among participants, see Thomas J. Reed, Compulsory Disclosure
of Confidential Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous Members, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693
(1996).
12
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34-36 (1967).
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A.

Norms and Law

In the vast majority of these situations, the law does not matter much to people
who disclose private information about themselves. When we disclose sensitive
information to friends, the law generally has little effect on our expectations that these
friends will keep the information secret. Rather, we are relying on our friend’s good will,
an explicit promise of confidentiality, or perhaps on an implicit threat of retribution if the
information is disclosed. Where confidentiality is breached, we might retaliate by
refusing to share information with that person in the future, cutting off friendship ties, or
disclosing to third parties sensitive information that the loudmouth previously shared
with us. A different dynamic arises when we disclose information to strangers. Here, we
are relying on obscurity—our own anonymity or the removal of the stranger from our
ordinary social circle—to protect the confidentiality of the information. In both settings,
however, tort law probably does little to shape people’s actual expectations of privacy.
There is, however, a category of sensitive information disclosure that is harmful
enough to warrant the imposition of legal liability. These instances generally involve
cases of substantial damage to the plaintiff and very widespread publicity.13 They also
tend to involve nonrepeat-player relationships between the litigants, perhaps
characterized by substantial power disparities, such that reputational sanctions often will
not deter the conduct in question, and the plaintiff has no effective way of engaging in
self help. Indeed, the typical invasion of privacy case involves a media defendant.14
Unlike the people who disclose information about themselves to each other, these wouldbe defendants are playing close attention to the law.
It is through the regulation of these legally sophisticated parties that tort law may
have a strong, albeit indirect, effect on ordinary people’s expectations of privacy.
Ordinary people will expect little privacy in a world where sensitive information about
private figures that does not appear to have been extracted and disseminated with the

13

As a general matter, filing a lawsuit for public disclosure of private facts either introduces those facts into
the public record or draws substantial press and public attention to those facts. For a plaintiff who wishes to
suppress private information that another person has discovered, filing suit is often a very poor strategy.
We can therefore expect that invasion of privacy disputes will be filed when the plaintiff has little left to
lose from further publicity.
14
Obviously, deep pockets provides a partial explanation for this as well. In some of these cases, there will
be an intermediate discloser who is not a party to the suit—e.g., a friend who has blabbed to a reporter.
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subjects’ consent regularly appears on television and in newspapers. Because people
understand that there is often an intermediate actor between the subject of the report and
the reporter, they will become more reluctant to share information about themselves as
information about others, similarly situated, appears with increasing regularity in the
mass media.15 The more ordinary love letters wind up in the New York Times, the more
guarded private figures composing such letters will become in writing and sending them.
All of this poses a real threat to human intimacy, especially for people who overreact to
very low probability, but high visibility, reputational harms.16 A society interested in
fostering intimacy should help people disregard these very low probability events.
Tort law can thus function as a form of social insurance: protecting those people
who engaged in socially desirable sharing of personal information, but who had the
misfortune to see those personal details disseminated to the general public without their
consent.17 Where a large group of similarly situated people share information about
themselves, but the news media publicizes only a small percentage of that information, it
can be efficient and just for disseminators to compensate the unlucky few.
B.

The Goals of the Law

Tort liability for public disclosure of private facts attempts to strike a difficult
balance by regulating interpersonal communication in a manner that enhances social
welfare. On one hand, the law seeks to encourage the expressive and psychological
benefits that people derive from disclosing sensitive information about themselves to
others. It fosters the kinds of disclosures that lead to intimate relationships, often
benefiting both parties to a sensitive communication.
On the other hand, the law seeks to regulate the further dissemination of this
information. My subsequent dissemination of secrets that someone has confided in me
15

The relationship I am describing, of course, is nonlinear. There may be a tipping point at which sensitive
information about individuals becomes so widely disseminated in the media that any stigma attached to the
disclosure will wither. This is arguably what has begun to happen in recent years with respect to the
disclosure of information about individuals’ homosexuality. In such circumstances, we might expect more
disclosure of such information within social circles. By the same token, however, as the stigma is
diminished, we can expect that the disclosure of the destigmatized information will generate less intimacy
between the discloser and disclosee and fewer psychological benefits for the discloser.
16
For a provocative discussion of this issue, see Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 723 (1999).
17
For a related argument, see Shubha Ghosh & Vikram Mangalmurti, A Social Insurance Perspective on
Security and Privacy (unpublished working paper July 27, 2004), available on ssrn.com.
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can be beneficial. Most importantly, it promotes the development of a relationship
between me and the person with whom I am sharing the information.18 Note, however,
that sharing private information about someone else seems unlikely to foster as much
intimacy as sharing private information about one’s self.19
Subsequent dissemination can also help the public understand existing social
norms:20 Indeed, gossip is often central in theories of social norm enforcement and
change.21 Of course, there will be cases where third parties who are kept in the dark stand
to gain substantially from learning information that someone else wants to guard. For
example, it may make society better off if a third party tells the faithful husband of an
adulterous wife about her dalliances. For these reasons, spreading private information
about others sometimes benefits society. The tort for public disclosure of private facts
therefore limits liability to defendants who (1) publicize information that is (2) private;
(3) not of legitimate concern to the public; and (4) disseminated in a highly offensive
manner.22 The first limitation helps keep instances of minor disclosure out of court, by
requiring that the defendant spread the information to a large number of people or, in
some states, a smaller number of people who have a special relationship with the subject
18

ALLAN J. KIMMEL, RUMORS AND RUMOR CONTROL: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND
COMBATTING RUMORS 111 (2004); Diego Gambetta, Godfather’s Gossip, 35 ARCHIVES EUROPEAN
SOCIOLOGY 199, 216 (1994).
19
Simply put, trusting someone with one’s own secrets makes one vulnerable in a way that sharing
someone else’s secrets does not. This vulnerability is an ingredient of intimacy. The relationship between
gossip and trust is less susceptible to categorical characterizations. See id. (“If I confide my secrets to you
this may encourage you to trust me and, in turn, to confide more secrets to me. . . . On the other hand, trust
increases the likelihood of revealing personal secrets to others and thereby increases the exposure to gossip
by increasing the circulation of material suitable for it: if you tell me in confidence a secret about yourself I
can pass it on to someone else and breach your trust. If we join the two effects together we find that gossip
ultimately should generate positional trust: it increases mutual trust among gossiping agents at the costs of
breaching trust with those who are the object of gossip. The overall effect on the amount of trust, however,
is not clear.”).
20
Ronald S. Burt, Bandwidth and Echo: Trust, Information, and Gossip in Social Networks, in NETWORKS
AND MARKETS 30, 46 (James E. Rauch & Alessandra Casella eds. 2001); Donna Eder & Janet Lynne Enke,
The Structure of Gossip: Opportunities and Constraints on Collective Expression Among Adolescents, 56
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 494, 494-95 (1991); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 334-35 (1983). In light of
subsequent legal developments, the eulogy suggested by Zimmerman’s title proved premature. See Patrick
J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93
(2001); John A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of
Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489 (1999).
21
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 57-59, 7980 (1991); see also KIMMEL, supra note 18, at 85 (arguing that gossip makes social groups more cohesive).
22
See supra note 2.
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of that disclosure. The third limitation protects First Amendment interests and immunizes
those who spread information that has substantial social value. The fourth limitation
helps ensure that run-of-the-mill information dissemination is not penalized and that
relatively unobjectionable breaches of confidentiality do not clog the courts. But what
purpose does the second limitation serve?
In my view, tort law’s public-private distinction furthers two primary purposes:
First, it grants the parties latitude to structure the disclosure of information in a manner
that furthers both parties’ perceived interests. If people really want to share the most
intimate details about their sex lives on the Jerry Springer Show, the law lets them do
so.23 This is why there is no such thing as inherently private information: In a nation
where reality television and blogging are all the rage, it is impossible to find a type of
personal fact that no one has shared with thousands of strangers. The law sensibly avoids
paternalism and defers to an individual’s explicitly articulated decisions to publicize
information about himself, reasoning that he is in a better position than the government to
weigh the private benefits and costs of this information dissemination and that the costs
associated with government intervention here usually exceed the associated social
benefits.24 Deciding whether a disclosure was consensual thus plays a pivotal role in
determinations of whether particular facts are private.25 For this reason, information
23

The law’s deference to individuals’ decisions stems from a belief that individuals are in a better position
than government officials to make decisions about sharing personal information. That said, my analysis in
this section suggests that there may be negative externalities associated with an individual’s voluntary
disclosure of personal information about herself in circumstances where that consent is not obvious to those
who hear the voluntarily disclosed information. It may be appropriate, therefore, for the law to require that
viewers, listeners, and readers be exposed to evidence of the subject’s consent in those cases where media
outlets disseminate previously private information about individuals.
24
Exceptions arise for a few categories of private speech. For example, the criminal law prohibits adults
from sharing with minors information relating to their own sexuality. See John D. v. Dep’t of Social Serv.,
744 N.E.2d 659 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a stepfather’s repeated nudity in the presence of his
teenaged daughter, combined with other sexual communications, constituted child abuse, notwithstanding
the lack of physical contact between the daughter and stepfather). These laws might also be couched as
protecting consent, however, because the minors participating in these conversations would be unable to
consent effectively to participate in these conversations and be exposed prematurely to highly charged
sexual content.
25
The leading case for this proposition is Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
For a discussion of consent as a defense in privacy tort cases, see William L. Prosser, Privacy: A Legal
Analysis, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 9, at 104, 123.
Under the view laid out in this paper, consent is often a decisive consideration in privacy cases.
That said, it is unrealistic to expect that people will always reach formal agreements regarding subsequent
dissemination in cases involving the disclosure of sensitive information. Litigated privacy cases frequently
involve legally unsophisticated plaintiffs, and the sharing of confidential information is so common, and so
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disclosed to another person under false pretenses that reasonably suggest confidentiality
usually retains its status as private information.
Second, the privacy element of the tort seeks to differentiate between those facts
whose disclosure promotes intimacy and those that do not. If I share information with
you that is widely known and readily discoverable, that disclosure is unlikely to promote
intimacy between us. The law of privacy therefore does not bother to offer these kinds of
disclosures legal protection. Rather, the law protects only information that is secret
enough so that its disclosure might foster the development of meaningful social bonds.
That said, secrecy is not a sufficient condition for promoting intimacy. Hardly
anyone knows my shoe size. But my informing you that I typically wear a 9 ½ does
nothing to bring us closer. Intimacy depends on not only secrecy or obscurity, but also on
content. That is where the “privacy” element and the “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” element of the privacy torts work together. Because of the privacy element of the
tort, outing a closeted homosexual may be tortious,26 but outing Ellen DeGeneres is not.
Because of the “highly offensive” element of the tort, publishing the closeted
homosexual’s shoe size is not tortious, but revealing his sexual orientation may be.
Where both elements are satisfied, we can be reasonably certain that the plaintiff’s initial
disclosure of the information had the potential to promote intimacy. By trusting someone
else enough to share information with him that is both obscure and sensitive, an
individual attempts to enhance the intimacy associated with their relationship.
C.

Privacy Can Be Objective and Descriptive

Given the functions of privacy law, one can imagine several paths that courts
might take to demarcate the boundaries between public and private. The first fork in the
road raises the question of whether courts should define privacy on the basis of a
normative inquiry or a descriptive inquiry. Judges taking a normative tack might regard

central to society’s flourishing, that formalizing all such disclosures via binding contracts would be
foolhardy. Many of the social interactions that provide the facts for privacy law’s leading cases involve
nonrepeat players, and highly improbable or surprising turns of events. The transaction costs associated
with preventing these controversies via contracts often will be prohibitive.
26
See Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as
a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientations, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857 (1993); John P.
Elwood, Note, Outing Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747 (1992); Keith J. Hilzendeger,
Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort Law Protect the Unwarranted Disclosure of a
Person’s HIV-Positive Status?, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 187 (2003).
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information about medical conditions, sexual orientations, and political affiliations as
inherently private, and information about child-rearing attitudes, movie rentals, and
Internet chat room activities as inherently public. But such a normative approach
immediately encounters serious difficulties. First, individuals and communities will
disagree substantially about what information is more private and what is more public.
Some homosexuals are closeted and hope to remain so, but are happy to share
information about what movies they’ve rented. Some people are quiet open about their
sexual preferences, but zealously avoid discussing their political or religious beliefs with
others. Judges represent an elite segment of society, and there is a real danger that the
standards of propriety that they introduce into the law will clash with attitudes that reflect
changing cultural beliefs and varied preferences among the citizenry.27

Second,

normative disagreements about what is or is not private are impossible to resolve. People
starting with different cultural priors, based on age, race, religion, or economic class, will
reach very different conclusions about the morality of collecting or publishing
information about activities that a plaintiff would prefer to keep private. Was it morally
permissible for Senator Kerry to mention the sexual orientation of Vice President
Cheney’s daughter during the final 2004 presidential debate? There is no objectively
correct answer to this question,28 and any effort to ground an answer in neutral principles,
27

Privacy is highly responsive to changes in technologies or social norms. Privacy law ought to reflect
democratic sentiments, not fight them. It would thus be a substantial mistake to embed in the law the
expectations of privacy that prevailed in one era, one society, or one court’s opinion. As Al Alschuler has
noted in the Fourth Amendment context, “for a judge to elevate his personal visions of privacy above those
of the rest of society would be arrogant and inconsistent with appropriate concepts of judicial restraint. A
test of constitutional protection that looks to changing cultural sentiments may raise the specter of
adjudication by Gallup poll; but idiosyncratic judicial concepts of natural justice—visions, for example, of
an inherent human need for privacy at odds with the visions prevalent in society—would have less claim to
respect.” Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 7
n.12 (1983-84).
Any normative framework regarding what should or should not remain private will be highly
contestable, which strengthens the case for privileging the descriptive as the normative, as this paper does.
Of course, one needs some normative principle for determining that privacy is worth protecting. See supra
Sections I.A. & I.B. That said, the structure of the privacy torts already makes normative considerations
relevant. An actionable public disclosure or intrusion must be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Given that a violation of community standards is a necessary, normative, element of the tort, there is little
justification for making the separate “privacy” element turn on normative calculations. This is another
reason why I advocate a positivist approach to privacy in this paper.
28
Compare Editorial, Outing Mary Cheney, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at A14 (“By outing Mary Cheney
before millions of viewers on prime-time television, Messrs. Kerry and Edwards may hope to score points
with their base of gay activists.”), with Brian Lehrer, Editorial, They’ll Point Fingers but Won’t Show Their
Hands—With the Media’s Complicity, Candidates Attack Opponents and Avoid Discussing Ideas, NEWARK
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other than popular beliefs or behaviors, is doomed to failure. Perhaps because normative
analysis leads to dead ends with respect to whether information is appropriately
characterized as private or public, courts tend to view the “privacy” determination in tort
law as a descriptive question.
Once a court decides to treat the question of whether the privacy element is
satisfied as a descriptive one, it reaches the second fork in the road, which implicates the
subjective-objective distinction. The courts might ask what the parties actually expected
when the plaintiff’s initial disclosure occurred. Or they might examine what the parties
reasonably should have expected at the time of the initial disclosure. For very good
reasons, courts have focused on the latter inquiry. It seems daft to render the defendant
liable for breaching a plaintiff’s unrealistic or foolhardy expectations of privacy.
Moreover, evaluating the parties’ subjective expectations of privacy requires the courts to
try to get inside the parties’ minds, and parties will often have strong incentives to lie or
otherwise shade their recollections about what they expected. As explained below, many
litigated privacy disputes will involve cases where the plaintiff apparently expected that
the disclosed information would remain private, but the defendant believed that the
plaintiff had no such expectation.29 For that reason, tort opinions have eschewed a
STAR-LEDGER, at 15 (“The Bush campaign is trying to focus voter attention on the fact that John Kerry
mentioned in the last debate that Dick Cheney’s daughter is a lesbian. This takes the focus off the real issue
of what legal rights gay people should have and puts it on the fake issue of whether Kerry invaded the
privacy of someone who is already out and who was already an issue in the campaign.”).
29
In this sense, privacy tort law is quite different from Fourth Amendment law, which ostensibly requires a
court to examine both subjective and objective expectations of privacy. The courts first ask whether the
defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, and if so, courts examine whether that expectation of
privacy is one that society ought to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). As
a practical matter, however, defendants virtually always claim to have a subjective expectation of privacy,
and the courts rarely second-guess those representations about the defendant’s state of mind. When courts
do discuss the first-prong, their analysis sometimes invokes the “reasonableness” issues that ought to be
analyzed under the second prong. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (discussing
the issue of whether telephone subscribers in general expect privacy in the numbers that they dial but,
strangely, considering this question as part of prong 1 of Katz). The second prong of Katz, the so-called
objective prong, is therefore the locus of most of the action under Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., James
J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward and Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment
Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 653-54, 679-80 (1985); David W. Cunis, Note, California v.
Greenwood: Discarding the Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38 CATH. U. L.
REV. 543, 565 (1989); Jon E. Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from
the Trash Pile—Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court’s Rummage Hands?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
581, 590 n.92 & 601 (1991).
Two other differences are worth noting here. First, in the Fourth Amendment context, the law
deems the government agents’ expectations of the plaintiff’s privacy irrelevant. Rather, the law focuses
only on what the subject of the search expected, and whether those expectations were reasonable. In the
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subjective inquiry into the parties’ states of mind, and focused exclusively on whether the
parties’ should have expected dissemination or not.
This brings us to the final fork in the road. How might the courts decide whether
the parties’ privacy expectations (or lack theoreof) were reasonable, particularly where
those expectations differed substantially? Here again, there are at least two options in
cases where the plaintiff and defendant differed about whether they expected subsequent
dissemination to occur. The court can ask what most people would have believed, given
the context of the initial disclosure. Or the court can ask about the probability that the
information at issue would have become public anyway in the absence of the defendant’s
actions. As a theoretical matter, you could answer the first question by taking a public
opinion poll and the second question by modeling the network of communicants to
determine whether any dissemination that did occur was likely or a mere fluke. The ideal
answer to the second inquiry would employ a sophisticated computer model that perfectly
reflects social tendencies, and predicts the ex ante likelihood that information disclosed
from A to B will ultimately become widely known in the relevant community. If
dissemination was likely or inevitable, then the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy at the
time of the disclosure was unreasonable. If dissemination was highly unlikely, then it was
reasonable for the plaintiff to expect privacy.
Courts resolving privacy cases have decided to pursue the “computer model” line
of inquiry, ignoring the “public opinion” approach to privacy. Unfortunately, they have
done so without the benefit of any obvious methodology, let alone the hypothetically
perfect predictive computer model I described in the previous paragraph. Lacking both a
computer model and an understanding of the science of social network analysis, judges
have relied on their intuitions to evaluate the likelihood of information dissemination in a
counterfactual world. Judges seem to be asking themselves, “had the defendant not
privacy tort context, by contrast, both parties’ expectations might be relevant. Before assigning civil
liability to a defendant, a court might want to know whether the defendant expected that the information in
question was supposed to remain private. Second, in the Fourth Amendment context, the federal courts
have adopted a version of what I call the hard-line approach to privacy. If an individual discloses
information with a third party, that information is deemed to have been disclosed to the entire world. See
infra Section II.B. and note 230. For criticisms of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
arguments on behalf of “privacy in public,” see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2004), and Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002).
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become involved, would I have expected this information to remain private were I in the
parties’ shoes?” I have suggested that this is the right question to be asking. But the
answers that courts have provided seem to rely on guesswork more than anything else.
We can use sociology to assess the accuracy of judges’ guesses, and perhaps to help them
make better educated guesses.30 Before we do that, it makes sense to discuss why the
“computer model” approach is preferable to the “public opinion” approach in the tort
context.
D.

“Computer Model” versus “Public Opinion”

There is, perhaps, an easy explanation for why courts have not considered using a
public opinion poll to resolve privacy tort disputes: No scholar has suggested that they do
so. But Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Shumacher have argued, quite forcefully, that
public opinion polls ought to be relevant to the courts as they decide whether the subject
of a government search had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that is protected by the
Fourth Amendment.31 It is not a large leap to apply Slobogin and Schumacher’s Fourth
Amendment arguments in the tort context.
That said, in the tort context, making poll data decisive on the privacy question
might be ill-advised. Whatever the merits of Slobogin and Schumacher’s proposal as
applied to searches and seizures, it is not clear why it matters whether most people say
they expect privacy in a particular setting. If large majorities of the American public tell
pollsters that “what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas,” this need not make the supposition
a reasonable one. To the contrary, it seems that courts would want to base substantive
privacy law protections, not on what people say, but on what they do. Thus the courts
may properly inquire whether it was appropriate for the defendant (and many other
people like him) to believe that a particular disclosure would not be disseminated widely.
Imagine a plausible situation where poll results deviate substantially from actual,
observed behavior. For example, assume that 80% of respondents say that if they found
out about a friend’s extramarital affair, they would tell that person’s spouse. Now assume
30

Alschuler, supra note 27, at 8 n.12 (describing the dictate of Katz v. United States that judges “assume
the role of armchair sociologists and attempt to assess cultural expectations of privacy” for purposes of
Fourth Amendment law).
31
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,”
42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993); Slobogin, supra note 29, at 263-75.
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that only 20% of people who find out about such affairs actually do inform the affected
spouses.32 Such a conflict makes the choice of “computer model” versus “public opinion”
matter, and whereas the poll probably reflects people’s aspirations (about what they
should do), the behavioral study reflects actual data about what is likely to happen.
People are social beings. They spend their entire lives disclosing information about
themselves and then seeing whether that information remains confidential or spreads
through their circles of acquaintances. To the extent that intelligent individuals are
gauging whether information they share with third parties will be shared further, they will
focus on observed behavior, not attitudes. Behavioral data is thus preferable to survey
data in privacy, just as reliable market data is preferable to contingent valuation data in
the realm of environmental law.33
A “public opinion” standard for evaluating reasonable expectations of privacy
would create other problems as well. For one thing, such a standard necessarily
introduces circularity into the law. A well publicized Supreme Court opinion holding that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy against the use of infrared cameras to
detect heat emanating from their homes34 presumably will increase the percentage of poll
respondents who view such searches as unduly intrusive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressed substantial uneasiness about the possible circularity between people’s
expectations of privacy and the content of privacy law.35 What’s more, poll responses can
32

Divergences between poll results and behavioral data are common in the information privacy context.
For an interesting discussion of these divergences and how they might be interpreted, see Katherine J.
Strandburg, Too Much Information: Privacy, Rationality, Temptation and the Implications of “Willpower”
Norms 8-13 (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (2004). Similar divergences between polling and
observation arise in the family law context. Fiancées who are aware of high American divorce rates
nevertheless assume that their own marriages will not end in divorce. See generally Lynn A. Baker &
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at
the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).
33
See Note, “Ask a Silly Question . . .”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1981 (1992).
34
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
35
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) (“Situations can be imagined, of course, in which
Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For
example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth
would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.”).
Some have criticized the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for facilitating the
incremental erosion of people’s privacy expectations. See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations
and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843 (2002). This does not strike me as a particularly
persuasive critique of privacy law. Rather, the advantage of the reasonable expectations of privacy
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be manipulated rather easily based on the way in which a particular question is framed.36
Slobogin & Schumacher point out that their poll results will vary dramatically based on
the subject of the search, whether the search revealed anything, and whether the poll
respondent is asked about a search of himself or a search of a third party.37 And, indeed,
polling is more uniform in the Fourth Amendment context, where all fact patterns
necessarily involve police surveillance. In the tort context, the public’s reaction to a
possible privacy invasion will depend heavily on the identities of the parties, the extent of
the disclosure, the purpose of the disclosure, the nature of the information disclosed, and
various other facts.
The case for “computer model” data over “public opinion” data, then, hinges
largely on the law’s preference for observational data over survey data. A complete
defense of computer modeling should invoke two additional points. First, jury sentiment
may be a decent proxy for localized public opinion polls, substantially reducing the value
added by survey research. Second, in defamation cases that involve privacy interests, the
courts have long relied on a methodology that is analytically similar to computer
modeling. In cases involving private figures or non-newsworthy events, defamation law
focuses on the truth or falsity of the defendant’s statement.38 The law does not focus on
whether the defendant expected that the information at issue was true, but on whether it
actually was true. A newspaper that publishes a false story about a private figure is liable,
even if the newspaper reasonably believed the story to be true at the time of publication.
As a result, the newspaper has a strong incentive to evaluate the story’s accuracy before
publishing it. Evaluating privacy is no more difficult for a would-be defendant than

approach is its flexibility and responsiveness to technological and social changes that affect privacy norms.
In any event, a theory of privacy grounded in a social-network theory / computer model approach will be
responsive to technological changes as well.
36
See, e.g., John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of Survey Response: Answering Questions
Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 579 (1992); Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and
Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 594-95 (2003).
37
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 31, at 762-64. For another report on the results of national polls
dealing with privacy matters, and how responses have varied over time, see James E. Katz & Annette R.
Tassone, The Polls—A Report: Public Opinion Trends: Privacy and Information Technology, 54 PUB. OP.
Q. 125 (1990).
38
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that private figure plaintiffs need not
demonstrate actual malice to recover compensatory damages); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual malice to recover
compensatory damages if the speech at issue does not involve a matter of public concern).
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evaluating truth, and in some cases it will be easier. And successful privacy claims,
particularly those involving public disclosure of private facts, necessarily involve nonnewsworthy facts and often involve private-figure plaintiffs. The analog to defamation
law, where expectations are irrelevant as to liability for private figure plaintiffs, even if
those expectations are widely held, therefore buttresses the case for a “computer model”
approach.39
It remains to be seen whether the “computer model” approach to tort privacy is
workable for resource-constrained courts. The answer to that question depends, of course,
on the state of the science, so this paper will evaluate that important question in great
detail. To foreshadow a bit, the models developed by social network theorists are
becoming increasingly sophisticated at predicting whether information will be
disseminated widely through a given community. Though their models remain far from
perfect, there are already enough useful insights to render social network theory a
superior alternative to public opinion polls for evaluating the parties’ reasonable
expectations of privacy. Before reaching that section of the paper, I will make the
discussion more concrete by describing the tort law in some detail.
II.

The Law of “Limited Privacy”
The American law eschews a categorical answer to the question of under what

circumstances a limited disclosure of private information about one’s self renders that
information “public” for the purposes of tort law. Puzzlingly, little legal scholarship has
addressed this central issue of privacy law.40
A.

“Limited Privacy”

Privacy law is better developed in California than in any other jurisdiction, and it
appears that California has most emphatically accepted the concept of limited privacy.
“Limited privacy” is the idea that when an individual reveals private information about
herself to one or more persons, she may retain a reasonable expectation that the recipients
of the information will not disseminate it further.
39

Nor does trade secrets law consider the parties’ expectations to be a substantial factor in whether a
valuable commercial idea has been shared so widely to have lost its status as a trade secret. See Rockwell
Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
40
For a notable exception, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1664-70 (1999) (embracing a limited privacy vision of the law, and discussing it in several
privacy law contexts).
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The leading California case is the supreme court’s 1999 opinion, Sanders v.
ABC.41 Sanders involved the efforts of Stacy Lescht, an ABC investigative journalist, to
expose fraud in the telephone psychic industry. To that end, she obtained employment as
a telephone psychic, and used a hidden video camera to record her conversations with
coworkers.42 One of these coworkers, Mark Sanders, sued after part of his conversation
with Lescht was broadcast on ABC’s PrimeTime Live program.43 Lescht argued that
because Sanders’ coworkers could overhear her conversations with him, he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication.44 The court disagreed:
This case squarely raises the question of an expectation of limited privacy
. . . [P]rivacy for the purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-ornothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one
expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the
expectation unreasonable as a matter of law. . . . “The mere fact that a
person can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she
can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.”45
The court thus held that information can be public vis-à-vis one’s fellow employees, but
private vis-à-vis the outside world. Sanders presumably would have suffered little
damage if Lescht had played their recorded conversations for fellow employees, but he
had a cause of action when she exposed millions of television viewers to the contents of
the conversations. Following a jury trial, Sanders was awarded $635,000 for intrusion
upon seclusion.46 In other interesting contexts, the California courts generally have
adhered to the “expectation of limited privacy” approach laid out in Sanders.47

41

20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999).
Id. at 910.
43
Id. at 913 n.1.
44
Id. at 917-18. Approximately telephone psychics worked at cubicles in a large room. Id. at 912.
45
Sanders, 20 Cal.4th at 915-16 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1998) §
5.10[A][2]).
46
Id. at 912-13.
47
See M.G. v. Time Warner, 89 Cal.App.4th at 623 (2001) (holding that little league players and coaches
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their team photo, after Sports Illustrated published the photo in a
story about the team manager’s molestation of several team members); Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal.App. 4th 402,
441-43 (1996) (holding that an employee has a limited expectation of privacy in medical information he
provided to a physician hired by his employer for the purposes of evaluating the employee’s disability
claim); Urbaniak v. Newton, 226 Cal.App. 3d 1128 (1991) (holding that a patient’s disclosure of his HIV
positive status to a nurse, for the purpose of warning her about the risk of infection, did not amount to
consent for the nurse’s supervising physician to include the patient’s HIV status in a report evaluating the
42
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This notion of “limited privacy” does not turn up only in intrusion upon seclusion
cases like Sanders. Rather, it has found receptive audiences in several other cases
involving public disclosure of private facts. Courts willingness to accept “limited
privacy” arguments in both the intrusion and public disclosure contexts makes sense,
since the intrusion tort’s concept of privacy fully encompasses the conception of privacy
that arises in the public disclosure context.48 The two leading public disclosure cases
appear to be Missouri’s Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital,49 and Georgia’s Multimedia WMAZ, Inc.
v. Kubach,50 although a number of other cases contain similar reasoning.51

employee’s workers’ compensation claim); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.App.3d 1420
(1988) (holding that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her having witnessed the
murder of her roommate by an at-large suspect, even though she had shared this information with friends,
relatives, and police officers).
The only California case that, at first glance, seems like a rejection of “limited privacy”
underscores just how far the principle extends. In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d.
1040 (1984), the California courts held that a plaintiff’s decision to share information about his
homosexuality with members of the gay community deprived him of a cause of action when a general
circulation San Francisco newspaper mentioned his orientation after he became a public figure by foiling an
assassination attempt against President Ford. Sipple argued that his willingness to share his sexual
orientation with supportive gays hardly indicated a willingness to share it with unsupportive heterosexuals.
Indeed, Sipple’s family shunned him after they learned about his sexual orientation. Id. at 1044-45. The
court held that Sipple’s sexual orientation had become a matter of public knowledge well before the
defendant’s publication, citing the fact that Sipple’s orientation was known to “hundreds of people in a
variety of cities, including New York, Dallas, Houston, San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.” Id. at
1047. The court further emphasized that several gay magazines had published stories referencing Sipple’s
homosexuality. Id. at 1047-48. Against this backdrop, and with Sipple gaining substantial fame by virtue of
his heroic act, the court was incredulous that Sipple’s poorly-kept secret would have remained unknown to
heterosexuals generally had the defendant not acted. For further discussion of Sipple, see infra note 202.
48
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (defining intrusion upon seclusion as an
intentional intrusion “upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns”), with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (defining public disclosure as giving publicity “to a matter
concerning the private life of another”). It is difficult to imagine how something can be another’s “private
affair or concern,” but not “a matter concerning the private life of another.”
49
795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
50
443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994).
51
See, e.g., Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Serv., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that female models who
undressed in each other’s presence had a cause of action against peeping Tom security guards, who used a
security camera to leer at the models in various states of undress); Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d
1383 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs’ having turned over a diary to police investigators did not
indicate a willingness to have the diary released to an author for use in a published book); Huskey v. NBC,
632 F.Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that a prisoner who worked out in a prison’s exercise cage had a
reasonable expectation of privacy against being filmed for a television broadcast, even though other
inmates and prison guards could see him exercising); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d
580 (D.C. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff had a privacy claim against those who disclosed that she had
undergone plastic surgery, even though the plaintiff had told her family and friends about the procedure);
Benitez v. KFC, 714 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that male employees’ spying on multiple
undressing female employees is intrusion upon seclusion even though the undressed coworkers disrobed in
each other’s presence); Peckham v. Boston Herald, 719 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. 1999) (holding that the
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Y.G. involved spouses who found themselves unable to conceive a child naturally.
They therefore underwent in vitro fertilization at the defendant hospital, resulting in a
pregnancy. Only hospital employees and the mother of one of the plaintiffs knew about
the couple’s participation in the in vitro program, and the couple apparently did not tell
others about their involvement because their church condemned the practice.52 Several
months into the wife’s pregnancy, the couple was invited to a party at the hospital to
celebrate the in vitro fertilization program’s five-year anniversary.53 A camera crew and
reporter from a local television station were at the party, and, although the plaintiffs
refused to be interviewed and “made every reasonable effort” to avoid being filmed, their
image was used on the nightly news, with a voiceover stating that the (unnamed)
plaintiffs were expecting triplets as a result of their participation in the program.54 After
the broadcast, the plaintiffs were chastised by their church and the husband was ridiculed
at his workplace.55 The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had waived any reasonable
expectation of privacy as to their involvement in the in vitro clinic by attending a party
that forty other people also attended.56 The court rejected this argument, holding that by
attending the party the plaintiffs “clearly chose to disclose their participation to only the
other in vtiro couples. By so attending this limited gathering, they did not waive their
right to keep their condition and the process of in vitro private, in respect to the general
public.”57
Similarly, in Multimedia WMAZ v. Kubach, the plaintiff was an HIV-positive man
who had disclosed his condition to relatives, friends, medical personnel, and members of
his AIDS support group, approximately sixty people in all.58 Kubach agreed to appear on
a local television broadcast to discuss AIDS, and was assured by station personnel that

plaintiff’s disclosure of his involvement in a paternity suit with his daughter and two close friends did not
necessarily waive a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information).
52
795 S.W.2d at 492-93.
53
Id. at 492.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 493.
56
Id. at 502; Id. at 503, 504 (Gaertner, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 502.
58
443 S.E.2d at 494 & n.1 (Ga. 1994).
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his face would be digitized, and hence unrecognizable to the viewing audience.59 The
station employee responsible for the digitization evidently set the digitization setting too
low, and Kubach was recognized by members of his local community when the broadcast
aired.60 After Kubach sued the station for invasion of privacy, the station responded by
arguing that Kubach had waived his expectation of privacy in his HIV status by
disclosing it to his friends, relatives, acquaintances, and medical service providers.61 The
court disagreed, noting that Kubach had made these disclosures to people who “cared
about him . . . or because they also had AIDS.”62 Although Kubach did not tell his friends
and relatives to keep his HIV status confidential, “there was also testimony that they
understood that plaintiff’s condition was not something they would discuss
indiscriminately.”63
These cases suggest that even if a plaintiff reveals information about himself to
dozens of people, and even if there are no legal or contractual constraints on those
peoples’ ability to disseminate the information further, the information can remain
“private” for the purposes of privacy tort law. Such information can remain private
regardless of whether the people to whom the information was initially disclosed were
the plaintiffs’ intimates (as in Kubach), coworkers (as in Sanders), or strangers (as in
Y.G.).
B.

The Hard-Line Cases

Some opinions have rejected a plaintiff’s invocation of limited privacy, holding
that his disclosure to a group of persons waived all privacy expectations in the
information. New York’s Nader v. General Motors has long been a landmark case in
privacy law.64 The nation’s largest automobile manufacturer tried to discredit and
intimidate consumer advocate Ralph Nader prior to the publication of his best seller,
Unsafe at Any Speed. To that end, General Motors allegedly interviewed Nader’s close
friends and business associates about his racial and religious views, his sexual
59

Id. at 493. The court’s opinion makes no mention of Kubach pursuing a cause of action for breach of
contract.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 494.
63
Id.
64
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
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proclivities, his personal habits, and his political beliefs. GM’s agents secured these
interviews by falsely telling the interviewees that they worked for a company at which
Nader was seeking employment.65 Nevertheless, the court rejected Nader’s claim that the
interviews amounted to an intrusion upon Nader’s seclusion or private affairs:66
Although those inquiries may have uncovered information of a personal
nature, it is difficult to see how they may be said to have invaded the
plaintiff’s privacy. Information about the plaintiff which was already
known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff.
Presumably, the plaintiff had previously revealed the information to such
other persons, and he would necessarily assume the risk that a friend or
acquaintance in whom he had confided might breach the confidence.67
The court thus found unpersuasive the argument that Nader’s disclosure to this network
of close friends and associates maintained the privacy of the information that he had
shared. Indeed, the court rejected a basic premise of limited privacy—the idea that one’s
associates may be willing to share confidential information with people who were
considering employing Nader, but not with a corporation that was trying to discredit
him.68 According to the court, once one shares a fact about himself with a friend, that fact
is no longer private, as a matter of law.
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Id. at 564.
Because GM never publicly disclosed the dirt that it may have dug up on Nader, he sued for intrusion
upon seclusion rather than public disclosure of private facts.
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Id. at 568-69.
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Alabama has followed Nader’s approach in two recent opinions. See Myrick v. Barron, 820 So.2d 81, 85
(Ala. 2001) (“Barron’s argument fails, however, because interviews of other people about their knowledge
of Barron could reveal only information already known (or allegedly known) by those people. . . . Can
information which other people claim to know about Barron be protected as ‘private’ and, thereby, be
shielded from inquiry by this branch of the invasion-of-privacy tort? Common sense and legal precedent
dictate a negative response to this question.”); Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 700, 702-03 (Ala. 1997)
(“Johnston’s allegations concern only voluntary interviews in which the defendants learned information
already known to others. This information is not protected by the limited scope of the wrongful-intrusion
branch of the invasion of privacy tort.”).
The Ninth Circuit has held that Arizona courts would also reject California’s expansive
application of the doctrine of “limited privacy.” See Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d
806, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The question before us then is whether Arizona law would recognize as
objectively reasonable Devaraj’s subjective expectation that his conversation with the ABC representatives
would not be broadly disseminated to others . . . [W]e conclude that, under Arizona law, Devaraj could not
have reasonably expected privacy against the ABC representatives’ secret videotaping of his
communications with them. We conclude that the Arizona Supreme court would not recognize as broad an
interest in limited privacy as the California Supreme Court has done.”).
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A Michigan case provides further illumination. Consuelo Sanchez Duran was a
Columbian judge who had indicted the notorious drug lord, Pablo Escobar.69 After she
and her family received several death threats, she resigned from the bench and fled the
country. Duran took a job as the Columbian Consul in Detroit, and signed a lease for an
apartment in the area.70 The State Department hired security guards to protect Duran.
Duran used her real name when shopping in stores or eating at restaurants and told a few
of her curious neighbors that she had been threatened by drug dealers.71 At the same time,
Duran “kept an unlisted telephone number, did not join any social clubs or organizations,
and did not attend any concerts, sporting events, or motion pictures.”72 A few months
after Duran moved to Detroit, local reporters exposed Duran’s history and disclosed her
address, providing readers and television viewers with photographs of her apartment
complex.73 At least one reporter also described a $1 million bounty that the Columbian
drug cartel had placed on Duran’s head.74 Duran sued the media outlets for public
disclosure of private facts, but the courts affirmed the lower courts’ decision to grant the
defendants summary judgment. In the court’s assessment, the plaintiff’s actions in the
United States had rendered her identity “open to the public eye.”75
Fisher v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,76 completes the
trilogy of interesting hard-line opinions. In that case, the plaintiff told three coworkers
that some of her interactions with her seven-year-old son had “sexual overtones.” The
court held that this disclosure rendered the information nonprivate, such that the
plaintiff’s employer was free to disclose the information to her soon-to-be ex-husband. In
the court’s view “the report merely recounts a conversation which the plaintiff publicly
and openly conducted with her fellow employees. The plaintiff’s discussion of her
69

Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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Id. at 72; see also Stressman v. American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa
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personal experiences were freely offered to the persons around her without concern of the
impact it might have on her character.”77
By way of summary, then, what constitutes a “private” matter for the purposes of
privacy tort law is not obvious. The courts are not being terribly explicit or precise about
why particular disclosures waive privacy expectations and others do not. Certainly, a
simple head-counting approach does not reconcile the precedents. After all, Kubach’s
disclosure of facts to sixty people did not render them public, but Fisher’s disclosure to
three people did.
All these cases involve judicial efforts to assess the flow of information through
social networks. At this point, it therefore seems appropriate to examine how a
sociologist might try to answer the questions that courts are considering in these kinds of
cases.
III.

Social Network Theory
For the past several decades, sociologists, epidemiologists, computer scientists,

electrical engineers, economists, and researchers from various other fields have been
converging on an understanding of the way that much of the world works, best described

77

Id. at 903 (emphasis added).
Another line of privacy authority is broadly consistent with the Nader / Fisher / Duran approach
to limited privacy. This line of cases suggests that a subject does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to acts that occur in public places or are otherwise visible to the public. See DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 95-96 (2003) (collecting cases); Lance E.
Rothenberg, Comment, Re-thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal
Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1127,
1146-55 (2000) (same); but see Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (permitting a
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Cook v. WHDH-TV, Inc., 37 Media L. Rep. 1242, 1999 WL 1327222, at *5 (Mass. Super. Mar. 4, 1999)
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Hence, a couple photographed kissing at a farmer’s market has no cause of action against a news magazine
that published this photograph, Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444-45 (Cal. 1953), a couple filmed
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v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). If a tree falls in a public forest,
the images of its fall become public, even if the photographer who captures it on film was the only person
around to see it fall.
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as “network theory.”78 The basic challenge of network theory is to understand how
change occurs and is transmitted among adjacent units in any kind of network.79 Perhaps
surprisingly, the same basic insights about network structure have been found applicable
to a variety of disparate disciplines. For example, scholars studying the flow of electricity
through power grids have noticed substantial structural similarities to the way that
impulses make their way through the neural networks of various species.80 Similarly,
epidemiologists are examining how diseases spread through particular populations,
looking at the levels of connectedness between members of an at-risk population,81 in
much the same way that scholars of organizational structure have studied the overlapping
memberships of American corporate boards of directors, searching for clues about the
effects of inter-connectedness on corporate governance.82 Whether scientists are
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See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis, Mina Yoo & Wayne E. Baker, The Small World of the American Corporate
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discussing computer networks, social networks,83 or biological networks, the same
“scale-free” patterns of network structure are frequently observable.84
A scale-free network, sometimes called a “power-law” network, has a very large
number of poorly connected nodes (called “peripherals”) and a smaller number of highly
connected nodes (called “supernodes” or “hubs”) that actively transmit lots of data to
many other nodes.85 We can contrast this scale-free structure with a random network
structure, where one would expect each node in a network to have approximately the
same number of links to other nodes. This distinction becomes relevant to our purposes
because it turns out that most human social networks, particularly information networks,
are scale-free.86
Figure 1 contrasts a “pure” scale-free structure on the left, with a random structure
on the right. In the pure scale-free network each (relatively isolated) peripheral actor (P)
is connected to a single (well-connected) supernode (S).87 There are a total of eight links
in the scale-free network, each represented by a line. In the random network, there are
also a total of eight links among actors, and each actor is connected to between one and
three other actors. Even a cursory examination of the diagrams below shows that a scalefree structure is far more efficient at linking up a society of actors, provided, of course,
that all connections and actors are stable, and that there is no danger of network
congestion. For example, P1 and P3 can be connected via two links in the scale-free
network, as can any other peripherals. In the random network, however, connecting
actors presents much greater difficulties. Linking up P1 and P3 requires connecting via
83
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P5, P4, P8, and P9. Indeed, with only eight connections and nine actors, there is a
substantial possibility that the members of a random network will not be able to connect
at all. So if one removes the linkage between P4 and P5, and replaces it with a linkage
connecting P7 and P6, at least two of the actors (P1 and P5) will become entirely isolated
from the group.

Figure 1: Scale-Free Networks versus Random Networks

Random Network

“Pure” Scale-Free Network

P1

P2

P3

P1

P2

P3

P4

S

P5

P4

P5

P6

P6

P7

P8

P7

P8

P9

In the context of social connections, the scale-free social structure can be
illustrated using the only social networking game that has penetrated American popular
culture: Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon. In 1997, fraternity brothers at William and Mary
discovered that the actor Kevin Bacon could be connected to virtually all of the roughly
half a million people who had acted in feature films since 1898.88 The students
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BARABASI, supra note 78, at 93-96; see also The Oracle of Bacon at Virginia, available at
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/oracle/ (visited May 9, 2004) (noting that 12% of the movie actor universe
cannot be linked to the rest of the movie universe, either because they appeared in straight-to-video films
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popularized a game, the object of which was to figure out how to connect a particular
actor to Kevin Bacon in the fewest number of links possible. For instance, the actor
Laurence Fishburne appeared in Mystic River with Kevin Bacon in 2003. Fishburne is
one of 1,673 actors with a Bacon number of one. Carrie-Anne Moss has not appeared in a
film with Kevin Bacon, but costarred in the Matrix films with Laurence Fishburne, so she
has a Bacon number of two, along with 130,850 other actors. Justin Allder, is one of
349,031 actors who has a Bacon number of three, having appeared in the obscure 1996
film, Sabotage, with Carrie-Anne Moss, who appeared in the Matrix films with Laurence
Fishburne, who appeared in Mystic River with Kevin Bacon.89
The average actor in the Internet Movie Database has a Kevin Bacon number of
2.941—meaning that he can be connected to Kevin Bacon through less than two other
actors. This means Bacon is quite well connected to Hollywood actors, but there are
actually 1,221 actors in the Internet Movie Database who are even better connected than
Kevin Bacon.90 Rod Steiger—yes, Rod Steiger91—was evidently the best connected
Hollywood Actor of all time, with the average Internet Movie Database actor having a
Rod Steiger number of 2.676 as of April 2003.92
This data from the Internet movie database helps us understand the way in which
human social networks work. There are hundreds of thousands of obscure actors in the
Internet Movie Database, such as Deborah Reagan, who appeared in only two films
during her career. She happens to have a Kevin Bacon number of one, because she played
Kevin Bacon’s wife in the 1979 film, Starting Over. (Bacon and Reagan had bit parts in
not included in the Internet Movie Database, or because they have not appeared in any films with
mainstream Hollywood actors).
89
See Who is the Center of the Hollywood Universe, available at
http://oracleofbacon.org/oracle/center.html (visited May 9, 2004) (noting that as of April 2003, 1673 actors
had a Bacon number of one; 130,851 actors had a Bacon number of two; 349,031 had a Bacon number of
three; 84,165 had a Bacon number of four; 6718 had Bacon numbers of five; 788 actors had a Bacon
number of six; 107 actors had Bacon numbers of seven; and eleven known actors had a Bacon number of
eight).
90
Id.
91
Steiger is best known for playing Charley in On the Waterfront, where he acted opposite Marlon Brando
in the famous “I could’ve been a contender” scene. Steiger won the Best Actor Academy Award for the
1967 film, In the Heat of the Night.
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The remainder of the top ten list consists of Christopher Lee, Dennis Hopper, Donald Pleasence (who?),
Donald Sutherland, Max Von Sydow, Anthony Quinn, Charlton Heston, Harvey Keitel, and Martin Sheen.
Shelley Winters is the most connected actress—she ranks twenty-first all time. See
http://oracleofbacon.org/oracle/center_list.html (visited May 9, 2004).
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that movie.) In any event, we can contrast the plethora of Deborah Reagans with the few
thousand Kevin Bacons and Rod Steigers who connect everyone in the actor’s guild to
everyone else.93 Reagan has a Bacon number of one, but her presence in the Internet
Movie Database isn’t facilitating anyone else’s connections. She’s just taking up space at
the periphery.
As we imagine our own lives and our own social networks, we can all identify
some Kevin Bacons and lots of Deborah Reagans.94 There are people who stay in touch
with old friends, throw dinner parties, play matchmaker, and, most importantly, have
close friends in a variety of different cliques. These are the Kevin Bacons of the world:
society’s supernodes.95 The Deborah Reagans of the world, by contrast, are more
isolated, hermitted, and aren’t introducing people who wouldn’t otherwise meet each
other. Deborah Reagan may have some friends, but her friends all know one another
already, so she’s not facilitating new connections. She is a classic peripheral.
A real social network, of course, is more complicated than the Kevin Bacon
actors’ network. Most pertinently, a real social network is dynamic, not static.96 People
are constantly making new connections and old connections are disappearing, through
death, quarrels, geographic constraints, or simple indifference.97 Each of us can recall
93
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friends from elementary school, high school, or college, with whom we’ve lost touch,
along with scores of former neighbors, coworkers, service providers, and acquaintances.
In the Kevin Bacon world, by contrast, Rod Steiger continues to promote network
connectedness even though he died two years ago. Still, the similarities between an
actors’ network and a normal social network are substantial. While communications
networks among humans generally are not “pure” scale-free networks like the one
pictured in Figure 1, they do exhibit a strong tendency toward scale-free structure, with
substantial clustering among members, and a minority of supernodes who facilitate the
interactions between members who would not otherwise meet.98 Moreover, ties among
members of well-connected social clusters can be expected to become stronger as time
passes: The more time I spend socializing with Joe, the higher the odds become that I will
be introduced to one of Joe’s other good friends.99
All that said, what’s interesting about the Kevin Bacon network is precisely
what’s interesting about human societies in general. A rural farmer in Omaha and a
banker in Boston may be separated by only a few links, and yet they will live their entire
lives oblivious to each other’s existence.100 When exponential functions like these
operate, humans are sometimes genuinely surprised. Two strangers seated next to each
other on an airplane might utter with great sincerity the clichéd observation that “it’s a
small world” upon realizing that they both know someone in common who resides in a
distant city. The danger, however, is not this occasional surprise. The danger, at least
from a privacy perspective, is that people learn to stop being surprised by these
encounters, and guard their personal information too much as a consequence.101 Even
though our farmer and banker might be connected through only a few links, it will be
exceedingly rare for one of them to hear a story about the other. When only a few or no
links connect a group of Boston bankers and Omaha farmers, they are separated by what
Ronald Burt calls a “structural hole,” a lack of effective ties between the groups that
98
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renders the probability of information exchange quite low, even if both parties could
benefit substantially from such communication.102
This point is critical to the study of how previously private information spreads
through society. In scale-free social networks, there is always the potential that
information any person discloses to any other person will spread to the entire world.103
By some fluke, any bit of information might be widely distributed. Yet, as I will argue
below, in light of the prevalence of structural holes between certain social networks,
people will be well-served by ignoring this possibility, and the law ought to validate their
decision to do so. Relatedly, whether information becomes “public” will depend on
whether it reaches a supernode or not, and whether the supernode finds the information
worth disseminating. As I will suggest in Part IV, the fact that information has reached
one defendant supernode hardly renders it inevitable that it would have reached another
supernode in the defendant’s absence.
A.

The Strength of Weak Ties

There are people with whom we frequently exchange information about a number
of different topics, and people with whom we share less information, about a narrower
range of topics. Sociologists generally refer to relationships falling into the former
category as “strong ties” or “high intensity” and relationships falling into the latter
category as “weak ties” or “low intensity.”104 Assume I have two neighbors. Neighbor A
and I frequently discuss work, sports, television, romantic involvements, and politics.
Neighbor B and I occasionally discuss the weather and exchange pleasantries. My
relationship with A is a strong tie. My relationship with B is a weak tie.
In the real world, we can map these relationships onto organizational structures.
Imagine a large law firm in a big city. As a general matter, attorneys within the tax
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department will have relatively strong ties to other attorneys in the same firm’s tax
department, and weaker ties to attorneys in the firm’s intellectual property litigation
department.105 There will be some strong ties that cross departmental lines—for example,
the attorneys who serve on the firm’s hiring committee or management committee are
likely to spend a great deal of time talking to each other. But as a general matter, intradepartment ties will be stronger and inter-department ties will be weaker.
As one moves outside the firm, the same patterns hold. A tax attorney at Jenner &
Block in Chicago may have strong ties to a tax attorney at Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago,
based on having worked on deals together in the past or simultaneous service on bar
association committees. But most professional ties outside of one’s own law firm will be
weak ties, and in a large city like Chicago, the vast majority of lawyers will not know
each other personally.106 That said, the social distance between an intellectual property
litigator at Kirkland & Ellis and a tax attorney at Jenner & Block will not be substantial.
There is probably at least one person who knows both lawyers, and so an introduction
between the two attorneys could be arranged rather easily.107
Mark Granovetter’s work on “the strength of weak ties” has become a canonical
text in the study of social networks.108 Granovetter observed that social networks tend to
be highly clustered: I have very close ties to people in my family, but they have close ties
to each other, too, and their connectedness is not dependent on me.109 People within a
105
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closely-knit network are likely to be quite similar to one another—they may share the
same jobs, neighborhoods, last names, knowledge base, or alumni connections.110 As a
result, relationships within a close-knit group have high levels of transitivity111—all of
my friends on my law school’s faculty are friends with each other as well. This makes
information redundant within a network of people bound together by strong ties. By the
time I learn new and interesting information from a colleague, it is likely that other
colleagues with whom I am strongly tied would have already learned it, or will learn it
soon enough even if I do not tell them.
Strong ties are plainly a source of strength, but relying exclusively on close ties
for sources of information is a bad idea. As Granovetter argues: “Individuals with few
weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will
be confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends.”112 Granovetter
suggests that the economically disadvantaged tend to rely too much on strong ties.113 And
because strong ties are so much costlier to maintain than weak ties,114 poor people’s
heavy investments in strong ties preclude them from developing valuable weak ties.
Granovetter’s research suggests that weak ties are often critical in helping
individuals learn about new job opportunities.115 Weak ties serve a “bridging” function,
transferring new information from one closely-knit group to another.116 Information
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gained from weak ties is therefore more likely to be new and nonredundant. Granovetter
found that weak ties were particularly instrumental in helping managers and professionals
find jobs.117 Notably, each individual weak tie has a low probability of transferring useful
information, but because so many weak ties exist, their sheer numbers make them, in the
aggregate, a critical source of new and valuable information.118 Strong ties could be
useful too, particularly in job-seeking contexts where an unemployed person needed help
from a social contact who was highly motivated to help him find work.119
Granovetter’s analysis of how information about job openings gets transmitted
through a social network has obvious applications to the study of information diffusion
generally. Information dissemination through the wider society often depends on weak
ties:
What makes cultural diffusion possible, then, is the fact that small
cohesive groups who are liable to share a culture are not so cohesive that
they are entirely closed; rather, ideas may penetrate from other such
groups via the connecting medium of weak ties. It is a seeming paradox
that the effect of weak ties, in this case, is homogenization, since my
emphasis has been the ability of weak ties to reach out to groups with
ideas and information different from one’s own. The paradox dissolves,
however, when the process is understood to occur over a period of time.
The ideas that initially flow from another setting are, given regional and
other variations, probable new. Homogenous subcultures do not happen
instantly, but are the endpoint of diffusion processes.120
In Granovetter’s framework, weak ties help explain the spread of everything from
knowledge to fads from one edge of the global social network to the other. Follow-up
work by other sociologists has revealed that weak ties are particularly important in
spreading gossip and news, but information about new products and consumer
opportunities is generally spread through stronger ties.121 The chief advantage of
information diffusion through weak ties stems from the rapidity with which information
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is transmitted between different close-knit groups.122 Information transmitted via strong
ties generally spreads less quickly, but is more accurate and credible.123
Those who actively spread information via many weak ties function as
supernodes, and are likely to gain economic and status advantages because they are the
first members of their close-knit groups to learn about new information that has
originated in far-flung, close-knit groups.124 These supernodes tend to be happier and
better informed than the peripherals.125 Supernodes are more likely to be perceived as
“leaders” and are more likely to earn promotions within a workplace.126 Supernodes
maintain their privileged status by continuing to serve as information clearinghouses,
and, in certain contexts, become supernodes based in part on their willingness to share
previously private information about themselves.127
That said, there will be certain types of information that do not lend themselves to
communication via weak ties. For example, scholars studying product innovation have
suggested that weak ties function quite well at facilitating searches for stand-alone
information, but are not particularly successful means of transferring complex
knowledge.128 This suggests an aggregation difficulty—if two different people have two
122
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pieces of information that must be aggregated to yield a useful result, it is more likely
that they will “put two and two together” if they are bound by a strong tie. For example,
investigations into the September 11 hijackings have revealed that various people in
government understood different parts of the terrorist conspiracy, but because there were
structural and legal limitations on their ability to communicate with each other, no
individual had enough information to prevent the terrorist attacks from taking place.129
B.

Network Structure

Not all social networks are equally effective at transmitting information to their
members. Network structure will reflect varying gradations of scale-free structure, and
those variances may well be determinative with respect to whether information revealed
at one node of a network makes its way to a distant node on the same network.130
One critical structural variable is the prevalence of supernodes in a network, and
the social distance from those supernodes to the periphery. Under a “strength of weak
ties” analysis, we can see that the prevalence of supernodes who are weakly tied to
multiple different close-knit communities will play a substantial role in determining how
quickly and completely new information is disseminated through a society. All else being
equal, a society solely interested in the rapid diffusion of stand-alone information will
probably prefer for weak ties to exist between supernodes, as opposed to between
peripherals.
A second important structural variable is the extent of linkages in society.
Supernodes can have functioning weak ties with 100 people, or weak ties with 2000
people. The greater the number of active linkages a supernode has, the better information
will flow through a network. The same is true of a social networks’ peripherals, and the
“ordinary nodes” who fall somewhere in between supernodes and peripherals. Ceteris
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paribus, better-linked nodes mean more information transmission.131 Indeed, this idea that
links are essential is part of the basis for Robert Putnam’s influential argument that social
capital and robust associational activity help promote economic well-being.132
The need for concealment of network activities from outsiders may also decrease
the communicative efficiency of a social network. When the information at issue is
highly sensitive, perhaps because it reflects illegal or politically disfavored motivations,
network members will have to be quite cautious about sharing information. In such
circumstances, weak ties may become totally inactive, as individuals begin sharing
information only with well-trusted associates. Examples of such networks include
criminal conspiracies, networks of political opposition in totalitarian regimes, and
interaction networks in certain singles bars.133
C.

Cultural and Strategic Considerations in Sharing

Staying with the subject of concealment, sociological research shows that certain
kinds of information are inherently more likely to be shared among members of a social
network than other kinds of information. The better empirical studies of information
sharing involve topics as diverse as HIV status, student discipline, and bakery closings.134
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A brief discussion of these three studies will help contextualize the lessons that can be
drawn from the empirical literature on social networks.
1.

HIV

Courts often treat HIV positive status as a presumptively private fact.135 And yet,
not surprisingly, virtually all people who are HIV positive disclose this information to at
least some people.136 A 1995 study by Shelley, Bernard, Killworth, Johnsen, and
McCarty interviewed a population of 70 HIV positive people to determine how widely
information about them was known in their social networks.137
The Shelley study revealed several interesting findings. First, there were many
facts about the interviewees that were less widely known by friends, relatives, and
acquaintances than their HIV status. HIV status was more widely known within the
interviewees’ social networks than their political party affiliation, their blood type, the
presence or absence of a criminal record, their labor union membership, whether their
home had been broken into in the past year, their approximate income, their religion,
whether they’d served in the military, what the most important problems in their
households were, major life events that had happened during the last 12 months, whether
they had ever been shot or threatened with a gun, the amount of time they had lived at
their current address, where they had traveled during the past twelve months, and several
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other facts.138 There were relatively few facts about the interviewees that were more
widely known than their HIV status: just their sexual preference, their real first name,
whether they used illegal drugs, their number of children, their address, their birthplace,
their age, their marital status, their work status, and their occupation.139 To be sure,
someone’s HIV status may be more pertinent than his blood type, and hence an
individual may have more acquaintances who “need to know” his HIV status, but this
data still suggests that people’s HIV positive status is not a terribly closely guarded
secret.
Second, the researchers found strong evidence of selective disclosure within the
social networks of HIV positive individuals. Interviewees were much more likely to have
disclosed their HIV status to members of organized support groups than to their relatives
and friends.140 Indeed, a number of HIV positive interviewees reported that they were
reluctant to tell relatives, close friends, and even sexual partners about their HIV positive
status because of the fear of stigmatization, abandonment, homophobia, job loss, or
violence.141 Disclosing HIV status to support group members, many of whom were
themselves HIV positive, was seen as less threatening.142 Reciprocity safeguarded the
disclosures. Other studies of selective disclosure have found similar results in varied
contexts.143 There is a critical finding implicit in this data, although Shelley and his
coauthors did not highlight it: HIV positive individuals disclosed their status to some
members of their social networks while successfully keeping other members of their
networks from discovering the information. Disclosure to a support group member did
not make disclosure to other friends or relatives inevitable, even though those kept in the
dark might have been highly interested in learning about the interviewees’ HIV status.144
138

Id. at 203 & 192. At least 17 facts about the interviewees were less widely known than their HIV status,
approximately two facts were as widely known (health status, and education level) and 10 facts were more
widely known. Id.
139
Id. at 202.
140
Id. at 203-04.
141
Id. at 194, 204-13.
142
Id. at 204.
143
See, e.g., Baxter & Widenmann, supra note, at 324, 331 (finding that individuals were much more likely
to conceal their romantic involvements from their parents than from their friends).
144
There is evidence suggesting that closeted homosexuals consciously go to great lengths to make sure
that the part of their social networks that know their sexual orientation do not intersect with the parts of
their social networks that assume they are heterosexual. See Peter Davies, The Role of Disclosure in

40

Third, the researchers discovered that HIV positive individuals had unusually
small social networks.145 There were several factors contributing to this lack of links:
Some HIV positive individuals were shunned by former friends and relatives; some
withdrew from former friends and relatives as a way of sparing them the pain of death;
many had seen their social networks shrink because of HIV-related mortality; and most
interviewees were no longer working, which removed them from employment-related
social networks.146 Moreover, the HIV positive people interviewed tended to behave like
economically disadvantaged people do—they withdrew into small, close-knit
communities comprised mostly of other HIV positive individuals, cutting off many weak
ties with the outside world.147
2.

Girls’ School Gossip

A second important study of information networks predates the advent of social
network theory. In the mid-1950s, Stanley Schachter and Harvey Burdick studied the
flow of gossip through a school for girls.148 The researchers had teachers publicly remove
one student from each of four classrooms, explaining out loud that the student would be
gone for the rest of the day.149 In the remaining classrooms at the school, no students
were removed. The researchers then planted a rumor about the explanation for the
students’ removal with four student confederates, two of whom were in classes from
which a student had been removed. A few hours later, following lunch and recess, all the
girls in the school were interviewed to gauge what they had heard about the reasons for
the four girls’ removal.
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The researchers reported several interesting findings. First, all but one of the 96
girls interviewed had heard the rumor in question.150 Second, girls from whose classes a
student was removed passed along the rumor to a significantly greater number of
students, and spent more time discussing the rumor, than did those girls whose classes
witnessed no disruption that morning.151 Schachter and Burdick concluded on the basis of
this data that there were far stronger incentives to discuss and transmit the rumor “when
the issue to which it is relevant is important” to the audience and/or speaker.152 Third, the
planted rumor was not distorted substantially as it passed through the school’s social
network.153 The story that the girls told the interviewers was essentially the same story
that the researchers had planted that morning. Fourth, at least twelve alternative rumors
relating to the girls’ removal circulated through the school.154 Students in classes that had
witnessed a removal were much more likely to concoct new rumors and to discuss them
with peers.155 Moreover, students who were friends of the removed students tended to
circulate rumors that cast them in a favorable light (i.e., “she’s receiving an award”)
while students who were not friendly with the removed students circulated rumors that
cast them in a negative light (i.e., “she broke school rules and is being disciplined.”)156
3.

Hong Kong Bakeries

A third study, by Gina Lai and Odalia Wong, looked at the spread of an untrue
rumor through Hong Kong.157 The somewhat whimsical episode, and the data that Lai
150
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and Wong obtained about how the tale spread, revealed a great deal about how
information gets transmitted through large, complicated social networks.
On November 24, 1997, several workers at a Hong Kong bakery chain saw fellow
employees receiving layoff notices and evidently concluded that the chain was going
bankrupt.158 This belief was plausible enough, since during that same year a department
store with which the bakery chain was previously affiliated had declared bankruptcy and
closed all its stores.159 In any event, the bakery shutdowns would have affected many
consumers, as it is apparently common in Hong Kong for people to exchange bakery
vouchers, which can be redeemed for baked goods.160 With thousands of bakery vouchers
in circulation, the rumor caused Hong Kong residents to rush to the bakeries, trying to
redeem their vouchers before the stores closed. Within a few hours of the rumor’s
origination:
thousands of (Hong Kong) people, upon hearing the news, brought all
their vouchers (ranging from one to dozens) and rushed to the shops. . . .
[T]hey pushed and squeezed into the shops and got whatever cakes or
pastries [were] left. When all the cakes and pastries in the shops were
taken, many people would even wait for hours outside the shops for new
batches to come out. To calm down this mass hysteria, the [bakery]
immediately made public announcements to clear the rumor in that
evening. However, there were still people coming to the shops to redeem
their vouchers the next day.161
The rumor was totally unfounded, and yet it caused a complete breakdown in the
generally orderly Hong Kong market for pastries.
Luckily, something good came out of the disturbance, as sociologists Lai and
Wong were able to launch a telephone poll of 1011 respondents within a week of the
event, asking Hong Kong residents how they learned about the rumor. By that time, more
than 90% of the respondents had heard of the rumor.162 Lai and Wong’s data provides the
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most detailed analysis to date of how a rumor spreads through an urbanized society. I’ll
focus on a few of their more interesting findings.
First, informal social networks seem to have been vital in spreading the
information. Many people heard about the rumor before it was reported in the mass
media, and personal ties were the second most common source for hearing about the
rumor (after television).163
Second, only thirty percent of those who heard the information through personal
ties passed the information on to others.164 This suggests a tendency for information to
degrade as it passes through a network. It will degrade in a predictable manner, not a
random manner: People will pass along a rumor that they have heard if they perceive it to
be new and nonredundant, interesting to the relevant audience, and credible. The Hong
Kong data also suggests that there can be an opportunity cost of passing along new
information—in this case slowing down one’s dash to the bakery and increasing the odds
of encountering a longer line upon one’s arrival. Social networks thus function somewhat
differently from the communications network associated with the childhood game,
Telephone. Each player can choose whether or not to pass along the information to the
next player, and we can expect that many rumors will never make their way through the
entire social network.165
Third, people tended to spread the rumor to members of their networks who they
believed would benefit the most from the information.166 Thus, those surveyed were more
likely to spread the information to people who they thought owned bakery vouchers.167
Because the vouchers are frequently given as gifts, we might have expected reasonably
high levels of awareness with respect to whether close associates might have vouchers.
163
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Moreover, because the information concerned shopping for food, which is predominantly
done by women in Hong Kong, people were more likely to tell females about the
rumor.168
Fourth, those interviewed played some role in re-directing the information from
weaker ties to stronger ties. Whereas more than 74% of interviewees heard the news from
nonkin (typically coworkers), those interviewed passed the information on to a group that
was comprised of 45% kin and 55% nonkin.169 To the extent that kinship is a proxy for
strong ties, this suggests that most people were more highly motivated to spread the
potentially valuable information to those whose relationships they valued the most.170
Further data backed up this assessment. Among those who heard the information through
personal ties, 34% described their relationships with the informants as “very good,” 24%
described them as “good,” and 41% described the relationships as “fair.” But those
surveyed redirected the information to a different population: 52% of those who the
respondents informed of the rumor had “very good” relationships with the respondents,
22% had “good” relationships, and only 26% had “fair” relationships.171
Finally, the source of the information mattered—both the original source, and the
identity of the immediate informant.172 The rumor appeared to spread quickly, in part,
because it was reported to have originated inside the company. And it also spread quickly
because the rumor was passed on by people who had an incentive to be truthful—the
sampled population was more likely to pass it along to people they cared about, and we
know from other studies that information transmitted through strong ties tends to be more
persuasive and influential than information transmitted through less reputable sources.173
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D.

Interaction Between Structure and Culture

Synthesizing these insights about structure and culture can produce new insights
that apply to information dissemination. For example, structure and culture combine to
make it exceptionally unlikely that information about a private figure will be interesting
beyond two degrees of separation. Duncan Watts notes that “anyone more distant than a
friend of a friend is, for all intents and purposes, a stranger. . . . [A]nything more than two
degrees might as well be a thousand.”174 Watts’s argument that people have trouble
seeing beyond two degrees of separation is true, but it is also the case that, at least in the
pre-Friendster era, no one much cared about those people who were removed from us by
more than two links.175
An illustration will be helpful: Extra-marital affairs are fascinating events.176 That
said, no self-respecting person would go to a cocktail party and tell a private story about a
friend of a friend of a friend who is having an adulterous affair with someone unknown to
the speaker and listener. It is only if the speaker or listener know who the adulterers are,
or if the details of the affair are particularly sordid, humorous, or memorable that the
information is likely to get disseminated further through the social network.177 And by the
time the information makes it through this chain, it seems likely that the participants’
names would have dropped out of the story.178 Thus, when dealing with events described
174

WATTS, supra note 78, at 299-300. Diego Gambetta echoes this point in his discussion of gossip:
If [an object of gossip] were unknown gossip would be meaningless. This requirement
has been widely acknowledged. “Known,” however, should be taken to mean that [the]
object is relevant in some respect to both the transmitter and the receiver of gossip. They
may not know [the] object personally, but know, say, that they will soon meet [him.] We
are at times interested in the lives of persons we will never know personally, but only in
so far as they are friends of friends of friends. The more remote the link with [the] object,
the more speculative gossip’s motives, which ultimately pale into a near-universal
curiosity for human quirks.
Gambetta, supra note 18, at 205. This trend is a good thing, to the extent that we are concerned about the
accuracy of gossip and other forms of accurate information. With each retelling of a story to someone an
additional degree of separation from the subject, the story becomes increasingly inaccurate, portraying the
subject in an increasingly extreme manner. See Tomas Gilovch, Secondhand Information and Social
Judgment, 23 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 59, 64-73 (1987).
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Friendster is an-Internet based program that produces maps of its members’ social networks, facilitating
networking among members. It has proved particularly popular as a dating network, with individuals
examining the profiles of their friends’ friends for attractive matches. See <http://www.friendster.com>.
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Allport & Postman, supra note 124, at 509.
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See id. at 502-05, 512-14; supra text accompanying notes 151 and 155.
178
Id. at 505. For a terrific study of how pertinent information gets dropped from a story as it is
sequentially retold by several individuals, see Anthony Lyons and Yoshihisa Kashima, The Reproduction of
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via word-of-mouth, someone should have a reasonable expectation of privacy beyond
two links in a social network. If A tells B something private about A, and B tells C, and C
tells supernode D, who shares the information with the public, then A should have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as against D, assuming that A has no direct connections
to either C or D.
This rule of thumb appears to hold less strongly when one moves away from
word-of-mouth communications. Indeed, the increased prevalence of email, blogging,
and other new forms of communications in recent decades has facilitated the more rapid
dissemination of new information and created new categories of potential supernodes.179
Thus, particularly embarrassing emails or memoranda have on occasion made their way
around the world, even though few of the eventual recipients were familiar with the
original parties to the communication.180 The same is true of photographs or videos
depicting private scenes, such as nudity or sexual conduct.181 That said, the percentage of
emails that get forwarded beyond two degrees of separation from the initial recipient
must be so low as to render this risk the kind that a prudent private figure should
Culture: Communication Processes Tend to Maintain Cultural Stereotypes, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 372
(2001). Lyons and Kashima found that aspects of a story that reinforced existing stereotypes about athletes
were more easily recalled, and hence more likely to be repeated as the story passed through a chain of
people, than stereotype-incompatible information. Id. at 385. See also KIMMEL, supra note 18, at 91-93
(describing more generally how rumors change when they’re transmitted through multiple links in a social
network); Labianca, Brass, & Gray, supra note 114, at 64 (suggesting that rumors tend to get exaggerated
when they circulate in social networks).
179
KIMMEL, supra note 18, at 205; Uwe Matzat, Academic Communication and Internet Discussion
Groups: Transfer of Information or Creation of Social Contacts?, 26 SOCIAL NETWORKS 221, 245-47
(2004); Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in
the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 119-120 (1995).
180
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Legal Research? Get Me Sushi, with Footnotes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
2003, at A1 (quoting from a now infamous research memo about the relative merits of Manhattan sushi
restaurants, prepared at the direction of an attorney at Paul Weiss); Shaun Waterman, Analysis: ClockForward
Morality,
United
Press
International,
Mar.
3,
2003,
available
in
<http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030303-023031-9883r> (visited May 26, 2004) (describing an
off-the-record email that a journalist, Laurie Garrett, sent to a dozen friends, which was subsequently
forwarded around the world and dissected on various blogs); The National Debate, Paul Kelly Tripplehorn,
Jr.:
Your
Fifteen
Minutes
Is
Up,
July
15,
2003,
available
in
<http://www.thenationaldebate.com/blogger/articles/HutchisonInternEmail.htm> (visited May 26, 2004)
(describing reactions to an infamous break-up email sent from one Senate intern to another, and
subsequently forwarded to thousands of people).
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See Ian Ith, Local Porn Business Tries to Stay Under Wraps; Hilton Tape Bringing Unwanted Attention,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at B1 (describing the dissemination of an amateur sex tape showing Paris
Hilton’s escapades); Cf. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (involving a sodomy prosecution
of participants in a ménage a trois, where the sex act came to light after the daughter of a participant
discovered Polaroid photographs depicting the act and brought them into school).
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ignore.182 Moreover, so many emails flow into people’s inboxes that the likelihood of any
particular message being singled out for widespread dissemination is usually
negligible.183 Noise has long been an important method of protecting privacy.184
The presence of legal or moral constraints on subsequent disclosure of
information does (and ought to) inform a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
particular information too.185 Obviously, a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the privileged information that he reveals to his attorney. Barring a malpractice
suit, the client can expect that the information will remain confidential. But in certain
cases, there will be no clearly established legal duty directing the person to whom
information is disclosed. Suppose a famous actress attends an Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting and says, “Hello, My name is Lara Flynn, and I’m an alcoholic.”186 There are
evidently no legal or contractual constraints on the ability of those who attend Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings to disclose what they heard.187 But Alcoholics Anonymous
apparently share deeply held social norms barring the disclosure of information about
attendees outside of the group setting.188 If these norms are sufficiently powerful and
almost universally adhered to by those who attend Alcoholics Anonymous, even where
attendees are public figures, then the actress ought to have a reasonable expectation of
182

This is different from being forwarded twice, which is more common. By two degrees of separation, I
mean that the recipient of a forwarded email knows neither the recipient, the sender, nor anyone who
knows the recipient or sender, nor anyone who knows someone who knows the recipient or sender.
183
When information overload occurs, interesting information might not be identified as such. As a result,
information that would otherwise be passed along from one node to another never gets transmitted and
remains obscure. On information overload, see KIMMEL, supra note 18, at 213; Matzat, supra, at 226.
184
Prior to the development of modern communications technologies, individuals wishing to have a
“private” conversation might have met in a private space, like a home, or a deserted warehouse.
Alternatively, they might have gone to a crowded pub, where the chatter of fellow patrons created enough
of a din to preclude effective eavesdropping.
185
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Secrets and Secretiveness: Patterns in the Fabric of the Law, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 515, 531 (1990) (reviewing KIM LANE SCHEPPLE, LEGAL SECRETS, EQUALITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN
THE COMMON LAW (1988)) (“[B]reach of confidence clearly has teeth in that it affects how cases are
decided. When information is obtained through a confidential relationship, courts allow disclosure only
under extraordinary circumstances.”).
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The National Enquirer has reported on celebrity participation in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in the
past. See, e.g., Lara Flynn Boyle in Alcoholics Anonymous, NATIONAL ENQUIRER, Mar. 20, 2003, available
in http://www.nationalenquirer.com/stories/feature.cfm?instanceid=57345 (visited May 23, 2004).
187
Bree Schonbrun, Comment,“In the Light of Reason and Experience”: The Scope of the Evidentiary
Privilege in the Self-Help Setting: Alcoholics Anonymous Examined, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1203, 1225 n.
124, 1237-38 (2004). Nor are communications within twelve-step groups privileged. Cox v. Miller, 296
F.3d 89, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2002).
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privacy in the disclosed information. In short, certain groups can be designed to trigger
reciprocal nondisclosure, and people making germane disclosures within these settings
generally ought to expect that the information disclosed will not circulate outside the
group.
E.

Predictive Social Network Analysis

In 1977, Bernard Russell, Peter Killworth, and Lee Sailer articulated a lofty goal for
social network analysis. They noted that a useful theory of information diffusion “must
be able to predict how information flows through the system, how quickly it will go from
point A to point B, and how likely it is to be trapped in pockets and loops.”189 Twentyseven years later, perfect predictability of information diffusion has not been achieved.
This literature still has quite a ways to go, and would benefit from collaborative work that
can shed light on the legal applications of information diffusion and social network
theories. That said, there are several lessons from the literature that might help us predict
with reasonable accuracy whether subsequent dissemination will follow initial disclosure.
More precisely, information will or will not be disseminated through a social network
depending on these factors:
•

The structure of a network (Prevalence of ties and supernodes, mix of strong and
weak ties, proximity of disclosure to a supernode, the difficulty of aggregating
complex information through weak ties, the concealment versus efficiency
tradeoff in network structure, and the extent to which technologies used by
members of a social network facilitate or constrain information dissemination).

•

The cultural variables (Differentials in willingness to disclose facts to particular
groups or types, the presence of moral or legal constraints on disclosure, network
participants’ ability to know which information other network members are likely
to deem relevant, the propensity of certain information is likely to degrade as it
passes through a network, and whether the information is of the type that is
ordinarily transmitted through strong or weak ties).
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Cox, 296 F.3d at 111-12; Schonbrun, supra note 187, at 1225 n.124.
Bernard H. Russell et al., Summary of Research on Informant Accuracy in Network Data, and on the
Reverse Small World Problem, 4 CONNECTIONS: BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS 11, 18 (1977).
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Many of these variables will in turn depend on the nature of the information itself. Standalone information is efficiently transmitted through weak ties, but complex information
cannot be aggregated and analyzed effectively through weak ties. People try to pass along
information that will be particularly valuable to a recipient, based on their own awareness
of the recipients’ traits. Information about bakery closings will flow toward people
interested in that subject matter and away from people unlikely to hold bakery vouchers.
AIDS support group members may feel morally bound to avoid disclosing a fellow
members’ HIV positive status to a stranger, but may disclose the information freely upon
learning that the stranger is himself HIV positive. In short, structural and cultural factors
make it impossible to judge the ex ante likelihood of information transmission through a
network without knowing the content of the purportedly private information.
Interestingly, privacy doctrine essentially ignores the nature of the information itself in
determining whether a plaintiff who has disclosed it to some people retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy.190
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Recall that the foundational privacy tort—public disclosure of private facts—has four elements:
The defendant must (1) give publicity (2) to a matter concerning the private life of another (3) that is not of
legitimate concern to the public (i.e., it is non-newsworthy), and the disclosure must be (4) highly offensive
to a reasonable person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977). Privacy law thus
disaggregates the question of “privacy” from the question of whether the information is “of legitimate
concern to the public.” But as the foregoing analysis suggests, the privacy of facts and the public interest’s
in those facts are inherently connected. Information that has been disclosed to at least one person is more
likely to be disseminated further if members of the public will be interested in the information. See supra
text accompanying notes 151 and 167-169. If I tell you that I had a bowl of cereal for breakfast this
morning, I can expect that this information will not be disseminated further because it is so trivial that no
normal person would repeat it to others. If, on the other hand, I tell you that I watched Peter Singer eat
bacon for breakfast this morning, that information would be more likely to transmit itself through a social
network, because it would reflect the possible hypocrisy of a famous vegetarian and animal rights advocate.
There is a dispute among the courts with respect to the meaning of the “not of legitimate concern
to the public” prong of the public disclosure tort. Is this element descriptive? Or is it normative? Are courts
asking what the public is likely to find interesting? Or are courts asking what information the public has the
right to know? See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 77, at 108, 100; Geoff Dendy, Note, The
Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 157-64 (1996-97). The privacy
case law splits on this question, with some courts deferring to news media defendants’ judgments about
what information is newsworthy, see, e.g., Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976), and
others holding that information is non-newsworthy, even though tens of thousands of individuals are
willing to pay substantial sums of money to obtain the information. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet
Entertainment Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In my view, courts should ask both questions.
They should ask whether the public is interested in this information as part of the determination of whether
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that the information would remain private. They should ask
whether the public ought to be entitled to see the information under the “legitimate concern to the public”
prong of the public disclosure tort.
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F.

Lessons

We have seen that weak ties generally do a poor job of aggregating nonredundant
information that is possessed by multiple nodes on a network. Thus, instances in which
scattered private information about an individual is pieced together, and the aggregated
information is disclosed, can be expected to be rare.191 Where this information
aggregation occurs through multiple sources linked via weak ties, we can write it off as a
fluke that a reasonable person should have disregarded. By contrast, when scattered bits
of private information exist within a close-knit network of people linked by strong ties,
aggregation of that information is much more likely, and the plaintiff’s expectation of
privacy with respect to the aggregated information ought to be low.
We also have seen that the more interesting a particular piece of private
information, the less likely it is to degrade as it passes through a network. Thus, if private
information involves a highly unusual or surprising event, a well-known public figure, or
relates to an important current event or trend, it is more likely to be disseminated through
a network. Monica Lewinsky can expect greater privacy in her revelation to Linda Tripp
that she is having an affair with Joe Schmo than she should in her revelation that she is
having an affair with the President of the United States. Relatedly, once interesting
information reaches a supernode, the supernode is more likely to deem the information
worth sharing with her many contacts. And information that can be traced to an
inherently credible source, such as a bakery employee at a store rumored to be closing, is
also more likely to be disseminated through a network by people seeking to help out their
peers. As a general matter, then, a plaintiff ought to expect that if he discloses previously
private information that is likely to be regarded as highly interesting, novel, revealing, or
entertaining, that information is rather likely to be disseminated. And, as in most privacy
cases,192 where it is the plaintiff who has made the initial disclosure of damaging
191

This discussion applies to information that has been transmitted through face-to-face interactions or
telephone conversations. When information is communicated via the Internet or other archived
communications media, new technologies like Google might make aggregation of scattered information a
relatively simple matter.
192
But not all. There are privacy cases in which the source of the information about an individual is a third
party, not the plaintiff. Indeed, in some instances, third parties such as credit reporting agencies, health care
providers, employers, or educators may have access to information about the plaintiff that he himself does
not have. For example, an employer might improperly disclose to a third party confidential employment
evaluations that the plaintiff has never seen.
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information, the plaintiff ought to understand that his involvement at the story’s origin
made it more likely that the story would spread.193
IV.

Reading the Case Law in Light of Social Network Theory
Let us return to the tort law discussed in Part II. Some opinions hold that because

the plaintiff has disclosed the information to a few people, she can no longer recover on
the basis of a subsequent disclosure. Most opinions reach a contrary result, holding that a
limited disclosure of private information by the plaintiff doesn’t necessarily render that
information “public” for the purposes of the privacy torts. There is, in short, substantial
uncertainty with respect to how much disclosure can occur before the information
becomes “public.” Judges appear to be applying an ad hoc, “I know it when I see it”
standard to reasonable expectations of privacy. This raises the natural question of how
well courts’ intuitive judgments comport with the social network findings discussed in
the previous section. This Part addresses that question.
Before I do that, let me say a few words about what it means for something to
become “public.” In the cases that follow, I will assess publicity as the likelihood of the
previously private information at issue reaching the people from whom the plaintiff
would like to keep it. In some cases, like Kubach, that means people who have no
relationship to the plaintiff. In other cases, like Fisher, that means people who have
strong ties to the plaintiff. So at what point has a fact crossed over from private to public?
Surely the test for public information cannot be whether a majority of the American
public is aware of the information.194
Perhaps social network theory can be used to provide a more attractive answer.
One preoccupation of social network theorists has been to determine the size of an
individual’s social network. Although the studies vary somewhat, it appears that the
median adult has met or otherwise interacted with approximately 1700 people.195 This
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Cf. Runge & Archer, supra note 8, at 360 (noting that people assume that individuals are somewhat less
likely to disclose private negative information about themselves than private positive information about
themselves).
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If that were the test, then facts such as the identity of the House Minority Leader or the capital of
Canada would be deemed private with respect to the United States population.
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Peter D. Killworth et al., Two Interpretations of Reports of Subpopulation Sizes, 25 SOCIAL NETWORKS
141 (2003); Peter D. Killworth et al., Estimating the Size of Personal Networks, 12 SOCIAL NETWORKS 289
(1990).
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does not mean that the average person has 1700 active ties, but rather that he “knows”
roughly this number of people.
We can use this 1700-person threshold to establish the most liberal acceptable
definition for public facts. If a fact about me is known by everyone with whom I am
acquainted, as well as a few people with whom I am not acquainted, then that fact must
be public under any meaningful conception of publicity. If, on the other hand, a particular
fact is known by my friends, but not by any strangers, then I might argue that I retain an
expectation of limited privacy in it. To determine whether someone has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information, we therefore might evaluate the possibility that the
information will be disseminated to a number of people that exceeds the size of his social
network.196 If there is a low risk of such dissemination (e.g., lower than 5%), the courts
can recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The idea behind this approach, in short, is to assume that a plaintiff had perfect
information about the risks of various outcomes at the time of his initial disclosure, and
then assess whether those risks were sufficiently remote to justify the plaintiff’s decision
to disregard them. We assume that the plaintiff is fully informed about what might
happen, but not about what will happen. We then use this calculus to evaluate whether it
was reasonable for the plaintiff to proceed with the disclosure and assume that the
information would remain obscure.197 Because social networks tend to be scale-free, this
analysis should often direct our attention to the proximity of a disclosure to a supernode.
Widespread dissemination frequently will depend on the ex ante likelihood of particular
information reaching a supernode and being disseminated further via that supernode.
Disclosure to a supernode will not only increase the number of people who will be
exposed to the information at issue. It will also enhance the likelihood that the
information will “jump” across a structural hole that otherwise separates two distinct sub196

Most states hold that public disclosure of private facts requires the defendant to give widespread
publicity to the facts in question. In most states, and under the Restatement, disclosure to a small group is
not generally tortious, even if that small group has a special relationship with the plaintiff. A few states
disagree. See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 77, at 98-101.
197
This analysis should apply to the plaintiffs’ conduct taken as a whole, not to a specific instance of
disclosure. Thus, assume that there is a 1% chance of widespread dissemination every time Bill tells
someone about his extramarital affair with Monica. If Bill tells only one friend about the affair, he might
well have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. But if Bill tells 100 friends about the
affair, he should not expect that the information will remain private.
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networks. Through supernode activities, information that the plaintiff did not mind
sharing with members of his twelve-step group might find its way into a network of
dentists, professors, secretaries, or—worst of all—tabloid reporters. In a tort suit, courts
are always called upon to examine causation: Would the plaintiff had been harmed in the
absence of the defendant’s actions? Social network theory provides a basis for evaluating
that question when the plaintiff’s injury stems from dissemination of previously private
information. Courts simply need to ask themselves: Was the widespread dissemination of
this information inevitable, or did the defendant’s actions materially affect the extent of
subsequent disclosure?
A.

Evaluating the Leading Cases

Recall that Sanders v. ABC involved a conversation between two coworkers,
within earshot of other coworkers at a telephone psychic business. The problem, from the
plaintiff’s perspective, was that Lescht, one of the coworkers involved in the
conversation, was actually a journalist undercover. There was an obvious dispute in this
case about whether the communication between Sanders and Lescht was consensual and,
as I suggested in Part I, social network theory provides little direct help there.198 Sanders
might well argue that the journalists’ misrepresentations elicited from him information
that he would have never revealed otherwise. And, of course, had Sanders known he was
being interviewed on the record by a journalist producing a news clip, then he could not
possibly have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information he revealed. A
journalist, working in her employment capacity, is the most extreme version of a
supernode, weakly tied to all her readers, viewers, or listeners.
Social network theory remains pertinent, however, because ABC defended its
reporters’ actions by arguing that as a matter of law what was said within earshot of
198

For interesting discussions of these issues involving undercover journalists, compare Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (recognizing an expectation of privacy ) to Desnick v. ABC, 44
F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to recognize an expectation of privacy).
Social network analysis may have something to contribute to this analysis. We are generally better
able to determine whether someone is a supernode or peripheral if they are closely tied to us than if they are
weakly tied to us. Bondonio, supra note 86, at 301. One could argue, therefore, that if the discloser and
disclosee are closely tied, the disclosee’s actual status as a supernode or peripheral ought to be
determinative. If, by contrast, they are weakly tied, and if society wants to encourage communication
between weakly tied individuals, then the discloser was entitled to rely on the disclosee’s statement that he
was an ordinary telephone psychic (likely to be a peripheral) and not a journalist (a supernode by
definition).
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fellow employees could not have been private. According to the court, Sanders told
Lescht “about his personal aspirations and beliefs and gave Lescht a psychic reading.”199
This is rather vague, but secondary media reports suggested that ABC broadcast a sixsecond clip of Sanders stating that he had previously worked as a stand-up comedian and
implying that he was not a particularly motivated telepsychic.200 Suppose five or ten
coworkers overheard these statements. The odds of them having disseminated the
information to others were rather low, and the odds of this information having been
disseminated beyond the circle of people who knew Sanders personally were essentially
nil. Even if this stand-alone information had reached a supernode, no self-respecting
supernode would risk the ire of her weak contacts by passing along such trivial
information about a private figure.201 It is unsurprising that some telephone psychics are
skeptical about the soothsaying enterprise, and the fact that one obscure psychic
previously worked as a comedian borders on the inane. In holding that the presence of
coworkers did not render the communication public, the Sanders court reached a result
that is both intuitive and consistent with the social science.202
Kubach v. Multimedia WMAZ,203 raised the more difficult question of whether an
individual’s disclosure of his HIV status to sixty friends, relatives, support group
members, and health care professionals rendered that information public for the purposes
of privacy law. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the information remained private.
199
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Jane Kirtley, Cracking Down on Covert Media Taping, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 1999, available in
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under network theory too. In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal.App.3d 1040 (1984), discussed
supra note 47, the court implicitly held that once hundreds of homosexuals in several cities knew of
Sipple’s sexual orientation, and once Sipple’s heroic actions to thwart the attempt on President Ford’s life
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might further expect that the “mainstreaming” of homosexuality since 1984 has increased the number and
intensity of links between gays and straights. For empirical analysis of network ties between gays and
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PROFESSIONAL MEN (Dissertation Abstracts International, A: Humanities and Social Sciences) 2003, 63,
12, June, 4491-A.
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Obviously, much of the disclosure to health care providers would be protected by a
doctor-patient privilege, duties of confidentiality, and substantive regulations such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act204 and so these disclosures would
hardly render the information public. But what about nonprivileged disclosures to friends,
relatives, and support group members? The Shelley et al. study of HIV disclosure
suggests that information about HIV status is frequently shared with some parts of an
individual’s social network, while other members, who might know the HIV positive
person well and be interested in her health status, remain in the dark.205 Information about
HIV status, therefore, seems not to flow through social networks readily, at least in the
case of private figures.206 Although this particular fact was far more interesting,
inherently, than the facts at issue in Sanders, and although the information was again
stand-alone, Kubach had a reasonable expectation that his disclosure to some people who
knew him would not result in the information being revealed to others who knew him, let
alone thousands of people in his local community. So the court got this harder case right
too.
It is less obvious whether the court reached the right result in Y.G. v. Jewish
Hospital.207 Again, set aside the consent issue of whether the plaintiffs could have done
more to avoid being filmed. The G. family went to a party attended by similarly situated
couples in their local community, and were horrified when their attendance became
known to members of their church and the husband’s coworkers. The defendants argued
that by going to this large party with forty attendees, the G.s lost any expectation that
their participation would remain private.
Evaluating this claim is difficult, especially since there has not been an empirical
study similar to the Shelley study conducted to discern knowledge of in vitro fertilization
participation within couples’ social networks. So we will have to extrapolate from what
we do know. The G. family’s participation in the program, combined with their
203
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membership in a church that condemned in vitro fertilization, amounted to complex
information. Such information would be unlikely to be aggregated via weak ties. Hence,
if the G.s went to the party and disclosed to no one there that they belonged to a church
that condemned in vitro fertilization, then they should have a rather strong expectation of
privacy. Moreover, the objections of that church notwithstanding, there appears to be less
stigma associated with in vitro fertilization or infertility generally than there is for HIV
positive status. The hospital’s decision to invite a television crew to the party and the
other attendees’ evident lack of objection to its presence provides at least weak inferential
evidence in support of that view. From this it follows that there would be fewer moral
constraints among the people at the party against subsequent disclosure but also less
interest in spreading that information. Moreover, anyone in attendance at the party, other
than the TV crew, would have been a health care provider (with a duty of confidentiality)
or a fellow participant in the program. Fellow participants who belonged to the same
church, if any, would have been prevented from disclosing information about the G.’s
participation to fellow church members by a fear of symmetrical disclosure by the G.s. At
the same time, it appears that the hospital was located in the G.’s local community, and
their odds of being recognized by someone from their church or workplaces were
therefore heightened.
In short, the court’s determination that the information was not public is at least
defensible, and probably right, but ideally the court would have investigated (a) whether
the G.’s statements at the party transformed previously complex information into standalone information (i.e., whether they disclosed both their identities and their church’s
objections to the procedure); and (b) whether the G.s spent much time talking to other
party attendees and sharing identifying information.208
Duran v. Detroit News, Inc.,209 by contrast, is a case where the court’s analysis
cannot be squared with social network theory.

Recall that Duran was a former

Columbian judge who had battled Pablo Escobar’s drug cartel. According to the court,
Duran used her real name when shopping in stores or eating in restaurants, which waived
an expectation of privacy in her identity. Under a network theory approach, these acts,
208

I have contacted the attorney who represented Y.G., but he has not responded to my request for more
information about the case.
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combined with her notoriety in Columbia, would not have eliminated her reasonable
expectation of privacy in her identity. Shopping in a store or eating in a restaurant
involves weak-ties interactions. At most, Duran would have come into fleeting contact
with other customers or service sector employees. There was nothing interesting about
Duran’s shopping or eating out. In order to generate interest in the story, the defendant
had to connect Duran’s presence in Detroit to her past notoriety in Columbia and the
bounty that had been placed on her head. Such information was quite unlikely to be
aggregated through the kinds of weak ties that Duran established in Detroit’s public
spaces. Perhaps a Columbian waiter put two-and-two together, but this would have been
a highly improbable turn of events. Duran’s general obscurity in Detroit properly
engendered a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her shopping and visiting
restaurants.210
Nader v. General Motors211 presents a closer case. General Motors was interested
in obtaining information about Nader’s sexual proclivities, political and religious beliefs,
and views regarding race relations. Its agents therefore interviewed Nader’s close friends
and business associates under false pretenses. These acts raised the question of whether
the interviews amounted to an intrusion upon Nader’s seclusion. The court found no
intrusion upon seclusion, but it is difficult to answer this legal question in the abstract.
Nader was a public figure, and so there was a heightened probability that information he
revealed to friends and associates eventually would have been disclosed to the public at
large.212 That said, the likelihood of disclosure would depend on the extent to which the
information at issue was interesting or surprising, and the existence of any moral
constraints on the disclosure of such information. Simply put, one needs to know the
details of Nader’s sexual proclivities, political and religious beliefs, and racial attitudes in
209

504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Duran’s disclosure to her neighbors that she had been threatened by drug dealers, however, may be a
different story. Particularly given the size of the bounty at issue, one wonders whether the dissemination of
Duran’s identity (if not to the public at large, then at least to Escobar’s cartel) became rather probable if she
shared with her neighbors a detailed account of her tribulations. Unfortunately, the court’s opinion is quite
vague with respect to the details of these disclosures.
211
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
212
Statements that would be unremarkable if uttered by a private figure can be remarkable if uttered by a
public figure. An office worker’s use of an expletive is totally unremarkable, but the vice-president’s use of
the same word is front-page news in the paper of record. See Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Owns up to
Profanity Incident and Says He “Felt Better Afterwards,” N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2004, at A1.
210
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order to determine whether he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy against
subsequent disclosure of them to third parties.
Social network theory even helps us understand the numerically puzzling result in
Fisher v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,213 where the plaintiff’s
disclosure of information to three coworkers rendered it nonprivate as a matter of law.
Recall that the information at issue there involved sexually charged encounters between a
mother and her seven-year old son. At least in the United States, such information is so
inflammatory that it is unlikely to remain bottled up in an office environment that
includes large numbers of strong ties. In most American workplaces, people tend to meet
their coworkers’ spouses. Given the likelihood of at least weak ties between office
workers and the plaintiff’s husband, disclosure to him was probable, if not inevitable.
While additional facts about the relationships among Fisher, her former spouse, and her
coworkers would have been helpful, the court’s categorical determination is defensible in
light of the salaciousness and possible illegality reflected in the plaintiff’s disclosures.
B.

Judges or Juries?

In the cases discussed above, appellate court judges examined whether the
plaintiff’s disclosure of previously private information rendered that information public
as a matter of law. In cases where the court answered that question in the affirmative, the
plaintiff’s privacy claims were dismissed. But in those cases where the court answered
that question in the negative, the plaintiff’s privacy claims were submitted to the finder of
fact. Essentially, the trial judges were holding that the information at issue could be
private, and letting the jury decide whether it was in fact private.
In both Sanders and Kubach, juries ultimately found that the defendants had
publicized private information. The Sanders jury awarded the plaintiff $635,000,214 and
the Kubach jury awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory damages and $100 in
punitive damages.215 Thus, the jurors’ conception of privacy tracked the results that are
consistent with social network theory. In Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital, the court remanded for
a jury trial, but shephardizing the case reveals nothing about what happened on remand,
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578 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988).
See supra text accompanying note 46.
215
443 S.E.2d 491, 495 (Ga. 1994).
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and the local media stopped covering the story after the appellate court published its
opinion.216 In Fisher, the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s disclosure of
her Oedipal thoughts regarding her young son was likely to result in her estranged
husband’s learning this salacious information. Maybe the likelihood of disclosure was
50% or maybe it was 15%, but armchair social network analysis suggests that no
reasonable juror could find a very low likelihood of disclosure to the husband. The
court’s decision to prevent the issue from going to the jury was defensible.
In the other cases discussed above, Nader, and Duran, the courts similarly
removed from the jury the opportunity to determine that information that the plaintiff had
shared with some people nevertheless remained private. For the reasons stated above,
although Nader reached a result that may well have been correct under social network
theory, it presented a sufficiently close question to warrant resolution of the issue by the
finder of fact. Jurors could hear evidence about the facts of the case, as well as expert
testimony from sociologists skilled in social network theory to help them evaluate the
likelihood that the information in question would have been disseminated widely in the
absence of the G.M.’s involvement. In Duran, by contrast, it seems that no reasonable
juror could have concluded that the plaintiff’s use of her name in restaurants would
enable someone to connect her to the Columbian drug cartel, and it would have been
appropriate for the court to hold that the former judge’s identity and the threats against
her were private as a matter of law.
There is an alternative approach. Although it should be much easier for jurors to
apply social network theory in privacy disputes than economic theory in antitrust cases or
cutting edge scientific principles in patent suits, we might still worry that jurors will
prefer to rely on their own intuitions rather than the social science data, distilled through
expert testimony. If this concern becomes paramount, we might treat “privacy” as a pure
question of law, which would allow trial courts to develop a set of bright-line rules
regarding the division between the public and private realms.
Having said that, one can make a strong case that juries will do better than judges
in cases requiring social network analysis. Judges are constrained by precedent and a
216
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desire to develop a coherent body of law. As a result of that, they will sometimes seize
upon rules developed in one context and apply them to wholly divergent contexts. The
most egregious example of this in the limited privacy context is Zieve v. Hairston, a
Georgia case handed down a few months ago.217 In Zieve, the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered a privacy claim brought by a man who had undergone hair replacement
surgery at his local clinic. The plaintiff had agreed to let the clinic use his “before” and
“after” photographs in their television advertisements, so long as those ads did not air
within 500 miles of Georgia. After advertisements featuring Zieve’s photograph aired in
Georgia and he was recognized by a coworker, Zieve sued for invasion of privacy.218 The
Zieve court felt that following Kubach (another Georgia case) required it to rule for the
plaintiff, since Kubach has embraced the notion of limited privacy. But whereas Kubach
reached the right result under social network theory, Zieve almost certainly did not. After
all, Georgia residents (including Zieve’s acquaintances) travel out of state and watch
television while traveling; Zieve presumably had out-of-state acquaintances who would
recognize him in the television advertisements and communicate with Georgia residents
about this highly noteworthy information (“Hey, our buddy Zieve is on TV. You’ll never
guess why!”). The court should have asked how many out-of-state viewers would have
seen the advertisement and explored the attributes of Zieve’s social network. Yet the
Zieve court did not examine any of these social network questions, slavishly applying
Kubach’s apparent holding to an easily distinguishable case. Adherence to precedent, in
this instance, caused the court to disregard the inquiries dictated by social science and
commonsense.219
217

598 S.E.2d 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
The facts of the case suggest breach of contract as an alternative cause of action to the plaintiff’s public
disclosure claim. Zieve argued that the defendant had breached its contract with him. It appears that the
trial court granted the defendant a directed verdict on Zieve’s claim that the defendant had breached an oral
contract, but submitted the question of whether the defendant had breached its written contract to the jury.
Id. at 28. The appellate court did not consider issues relating to either breach of contract claim on appeal.
219
I have found a few other cases in which the courts have stretched the notion of limited privacy too far,
most notably in Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); Green v. Chicago Tribune, 675 N.E.2d
249 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996); and Veilleux v. Time, 8 F. Supp.2d 23 (D. Maine 1998). In all of these cases,
courts held that the subject’s willingness to share information with a journalist, on the record, did not
indicate a willingness to share the information with the journalist’s readers. Notably, Green relied heavily
on Virgil, and Veilleux relied on both Virgil and Green. Alabama decisions relying on Nader made the
same mistake, but in the opposite direction, holding that one’s willingness to share previously private
information with friends necessarily indicated a willingness to share information with the general public.
See supra note 68.
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Indeed, adherence to precedent may be undesirable in the realm of privacy law,
given the rapidity with which new technologies and new norms can cause expectations of
privacy to change. Making “privacy” an issue of law threatens to ossify obsolete
expectations of privacy that existed in an earlier era.220 Of course, for the same reason,
courts considering social network analysis ought to be wary of relying on dated social
science—a classic study like Schachter and Burdick’s221 ought to be judged in light of
recent developments at girls’ schools, like text-messaging, blogging, and the substantial
changes in adolescent culture that have occurred in the intervening years. In light of all
this, we may prefer to have the law of privacy determined by responsive juries that need
not worry about creating consistency in the law, provided the expert testimony at trial
informs the jury about how to apply insights from social network theory. The world is a
complicated place, and many of the “rules” of social network theory cannot be reduced to
West headnotes.222
C.

Institutional Competence

Some readers undoubtedly will lack confidence in the ability of courts to resolve
the technically difficult social network analysis problems that are embedded in privacy
tort cases. This concern might be particularly salient in light of the vexing problems of
hindsight bias that arise in the public disclosure of private facts context.223
But let us survey the performance of courts in evaluating the reasonableness of
privacy protections in leading cases. The courts in Sanders and Fisher reached intuitive
conclusions that map well onto the likely results of predictive social network analysis.
The court in Kubach reached an arguably counterintuitive result that is well-supported by
social network studies of dissemination of the information at issue there. In Nader and
Y.G., hard cases both, the courts reached defensible results, though I have suggested that
220

For a report on the results of national polls dealing with privacy matters, and how responses have varied
over time, see James E. Katz & Annette R. Tassone, The Polls—A Report: Public Opinion Trends: Privacy
and Information Technology, 54 PUB. OP. Q. 125 (1990).
221
See supra note 148.
222
Nor can they be translated into bullet points for readers of this law review article. To repeat, social
network analysis is often context-dependent in ways that defy easy characterization or simplistic modeling.
The “rules” of social network theory (e.g., the strength of weak ties, the tendency for social networks to be
scale free, the tendency of information of information to degrade as it passes through a social network)
necessarily operate at a medium to high level of generality.
223
On hindsight bias, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523-31 (1998).
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courts might have asked for additional factual information that should have had some
bearing on the likelihood of subsequent dissemination there. Only in Duran were the
court’s intuitions about how information might spread through society far off the mark,
and perhaps hindsight bias is to blame there.
In assessing this performance, courts appear to do a pretty good job of intuiting
sound answers to what are essentially predictive social network analysis problems. But
they provide little by way of explanation for these results, other than articulating or
rejecting the notion of limited privacy. Given this background, it may well be that with a
bit more methodological rigor and a few hints about experimental and empirical results—
particularly in those instances where social network studies produce counterintuitive
findings—courts can craft more transparent, and hence more persuasive, opinions in
these kinds of cases.224
Indeed, if courts are able to gauge the risks of information dissemination with
reasonable accuracy, perhaps ordinary people can too.225 One promising sociological
research agenda would try to see how closely lay people’s guesses about the extent of
information dissemination tracks the actual data on information dissemination.226 If
people learn, through experience, how likely dissemination is to occur, then this should
comfort those worried about the law’s decision to disregard subjective expectations of
privacy in torts doctrine and my advocacy of such an approach.227 Subjective
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Slobogin & Schumacher are less positive in their assessment of the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, as they note several instances in which the Court’s reasonable expectations of
privacy differ substantially from survey respondents. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 31, at 740-42.
This is interesting, since the Court has eschewed formal survey data in the Fourth Amendment context, just
as the courts have ignored social network analysis in the privacy tort setting.
225
Or maybe not. Obvious differences include judges’ access to the fruits of the discovery process and the
adversarial system of justice. Judicial detachment may also help them see social networks more accurately
than people who are embedded in them. Indeed, social networks research suggests that individuals tend to
overstate their own importance in a particular social network and overestimate the degree of connectedness
among their own friends. See Kumbasar et al., supra note 101, at 499.
226
As best I can tell, however, no one in sociology is pursuing such an agenda. The closest related research
agenda appears to be that of Tiziana Casciaro, at the Harvard Business School. Casciaro is studying
individuals’ perceptions of the social networks that surround them. She has found that location within a
social network, and personality traits such as positive affect substantially affect the accuracy of people’s
perceptions. See Tiziana Casciaro et al., Positive Affectivity and Accuracy in Social Network Perception, 23
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 285 (1999); Tiziana Casciaro, Seeing Things Clearly: Social Structure,
Personality, and Accuracy in Social Network Perception, 20 SOCIAL NETWORKS 331 (1998).
227
We do know that people differ in their ability to accurately map the information flow through their own
social networks. See supra note 226; Bondonio, supra note 86, at 325-26; Casciaro et al., supra note 226, at
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expectations of privacy and objectively reasonable expectations of privacy could
correlate reasonably well. What little evidence we have on this front shows that people
have a tendency to overestimate their own centrality within social networks.228 This
suggests, in turn, that an individual will have a tendency to overestimate the extent to
which his acquaintances will find the details of his private life worth discussing. If courts
apply an objective measure of reasonable privacy expectations, they will probably err on
the side of protecting privacy too little, rather than too much.229 Judicial errors of the
Duran variety will be more common than judicial errors of the Zieve variety.
We may also expect that helpful feedback mechanisms will develop from courts’
occasional use of sociological research in the same way that economic research is
occasionally used at present by courts. Although I have found a few illuminating studies,
the dissemination of previously private information through social networks has not been
a central concern of sociologists. Yet the privacy context seems like the most obvious
application of this discipline to a field of law. Were courts to take social networking
seriously, one can imagine that sociologists will conduct more studies like the HIV
disclosure and bakery rumor studies, each of which teaches a great deal about the
dissemination of previously private information through particular social networks.
D.

Extensions of the Approach

The issue of reasonable expectations of privacy or confidentiality cuts through
many different substantive fields of law, including Fourth Amendment law,230 the
292. We might suppose on the basis of this data that peoples’ ability to intuit social network theory insight
vary as well.
228
See supra note 225.
229
By “too little” I mean, relative to the parties’ actual subjective expectations of privacy.
230
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”);
United States v. Miller , 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”). Contra Smith, 442 U.S.
at 748, 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven assuming . . . that individuals "typically know" that a phone
company monitors calls for internal reasons, it does not follow that they expect this information to be made
available to the public in general or the government in particular. Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a
limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes.”) (footnote omitted); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974) (embracing a notion
of limited privacy, with respect to bank records, under the California Constitution).
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constitutional right of information privacy,231 Freedom of Information Act privacy,232
various evidentiary privileges,233 patents,234 and trade secrets law.235 In this paper, I have
for the most part confined my analysis to the privacy torts context. There are a couple of
reasons for this. First, the notion of limited privacy has found receptive audiences in the
torts cases, and so incorporating ideas from social network theory into the law would not
require wholesale revision of the tort laws in many states. Second, and relatedly, a notion
of limited privacy might be more normatively appealing in the tort context than in some
other contexts.236 That said, there may be substantial benefits from unifying these
divergent bodies of privacy law, and, in the event that the current paper persuades some
of its readers, future work will explore applications of network theory to some or all of
these fields.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), seems somewhat receptive to the probabilistic
approach that I have advocated herein. In Kyllo the Court held that using sense-enhancing technology to
obtain information about the interior of a home is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, “at least where
. . . the technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. at 34. This “general public use” language
suggests that, to some degree, obscurity is privacy, and people have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against facts that an individual might conceivably, but probably won’t, discover about them.
231
See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that the disclosure of information about
who has used prescription medication to New York law enforcement officials did not violate the plaintiffs’
constitutional right to information privacy, since such information was already routinely shared with health
care providers and insurance industry employees); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F.Supp. 376 (D.N.J.
1990) (recognizing a constitutional right of information privacy claim where an individual disclosed his
HIV status to police officers in order to prevent them from coming into contact with his open skin sores,
and the officers later disclosed the man’s HIV status to his neighbors).
232
See, e.g., United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749 (1989) (holding that an FBI rap sheet was private within the meaning of the Freedom of Information
Act’s 7(c) privacy exception).
233
E.g., United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1462 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Thus as a general matter, the
attorney-client privilege will not shield from disclosure statements made by a client to his or her attorney in
the presence of a third party who is not an agent of either the client or attorney.”)
234
See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (defining
“secret” prior use); Rosaire v. National Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that a quite obscure
prior use deprived a subsequent inventor of novelty).
235
Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that while the plaintiff
“could have done more” to protect the confidentiality of its trade secrets, “perfect security is not optimum
security,” and so the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on misappropriation of trade secrets despite having
shared the secret with numerous vendors); Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1141
(D.S.C. 1974) (holding that absolute secrecy is not required in order for a trade secret to be protected, but a
“substantial element of secrecy must exist”).
236
A criminal defendant might say that he was perfectly willing to share information about a criminal
conspiracy with his coconspirators, but had a reasonable expectation that the information would not be
disseminated outside the group of coconspirators. When the communication at issue concerns violations of
criminal laws, there may be strong justifications for holding that lessened expectations of privacy attach or
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V.

Conclusion
Privacy torts doctrine directs judges to evaluate whether it was appropriate for a

plaintiff to assume that her initial disclosure of information about herself would result in
the widespread dissemination of that information. As most courts understand this test, it
calls for seemingly difficult, generally counterfactual, ex ante analysis that sociologists
are better equipped to perform. In light of all this, it is perhaps surprising that courts seem
to reach defensible results in many of the leading privacy cases. Their analysis leaves
something to be desired, and I have tried to show that insights from social network theory
can improve that analysis. The substantial recent improvements in the quality of this body
of social science, mediated through expert testimony, ought to find their way into
American courtrooms.
The paper that I have written attempts to furnish courts with a theory of privacy
that they can embrace readily, taking as a given the choice of these courts to base the
privacy determination on what the parties should have expected to follow the plaintiff’s
initial disclosure of information. Where a defendant’s disclosure materially alters the
flow of otherwise obscure information through a social network, such that what would
have otherwise remained obscure becomes widely known, the defendant should be liable
for public disclosure of private facts. By the same token, when a court must determine
whether a defendant has intruded upon the plaintiff’s seclusion by improperly gathering
information about the plaintiff’s private matters or affairs, judges ought to ask whether
the plaintiff’s information was likely to have remained obscure had the defendant never
acted. For both these torts, social network theory holds out the promise of replacing the
common law’s vagueness with a reasonably objective, testable, rigorous, and principled
approach.

deeming such expectations altogether irrelevant. Cf discussion of Fisher, supra text accompanying note
213.
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